A voting-based agent system to support personalised e-learning in a course selection scenario by Aseere, Ali
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk
 i 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Voting-Based Agent System to Support 
Personalised e-Learning in a Course Selection 
Scenario  
 
 
By 
Ali M. Aseere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
Faculty of Physical and Applied Science 
School of Electronics and Computer Science 
 
 
July 2012 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
  
 iii 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL AND APPLIED SCINCES 
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
A Voting-Based Agent System to Support Personalised  
e-Learning in a Course Selection Scenario 
by Ali M. Aseere 
Agent technologies are a promising approach to solving a number of prob-
lems concerned with personalised learning due to the inherent autonomy and 
independence they provide for learners. The objective of this thesis is to find 
out whether a multiagent system could potentially replace a centralised infra-
structure, and to explore the impact of agents taking different strategies. More 
specifically, our aim is to show how intelligent agent systems can not only form 
a good framework for distributed e-learning systems, but also how they can be 
applied in contexts where learners are autonomous and independent. The study 
also aims to investigate fairness issues and propose a simple framework of fair-
ness definitions derived from the relevant literature. 
To this end, a university course selection scenario has been chosen, where 
the university has many courses available, but has only sufficient resources to 
run the most preferred ones. Instead of a centralised system, we consider a de-
centralised approach where individuals can make a collective decision about 
which courses should run by using a multi-agent system based on voting. This 
voting process consists of multiple rounds, allowing a student agent to accurate-
ly represent the student’s preferences, and learn from previous rounds. The ef-
fectiveness of this research is demonstrated in three experiments.   The first ex-
periment explores whether voting procedures and multiagent technology could 
potentially replace a centralised infrastructure. It also explores the impact of 
agents using different strategies on overall student satisfaction. The second ex-
periment demonstrates the potential for using multiagent systems and voting in 
settings where students have more complex preferences. The last experiment 
investigates how intelligent agent-based e-learning systems can ensure fairness 
between individuals using different strategies.  
This work shows that agent technology could provide levels of decentrali-
sation and personalisation that could be extended to various types of personal 
and informal learning.  It also highlights the importance of the issue of fairness 
in intelligent and personalised e-learning systems. In this context, it may be 
said that there is only one potential view of fairness that is practical for these 
systems, which is the social welfare view that looks to the overall outcome.  
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  Chapter 1.
Introduction  
Agents are special software components that work together in an agent frame-
work to achieve some end. Their main features include autonomy, reactiveness, 
proactiveness and social ability (Sampson, Karagiannidis et al. 2002). Multi-
agent systems, where several such agents interact, are being used in a wide va-
riety of applications, ranging from comparatively small systems for personal as-
sistance, to open, complex, systems for industrial applications (Bellifemine, 
Caire et al. 2007). In e-learning, they can provide new models of learning and 
applications, such as personal assistants, user guides and alternative help sys-
tems, which are useful for both students and teachers (Kommers and Aroyo 
1999). It has also been argued that using multi-agent systems to design educa-
tional systems leads to more versatile, faster and lower cost systems (Silveira 
and Vicari 2002). 
This thesis argues that the major potential in multi-agent systems has yet 
to be fully explored, and relates to the ability of agent systems to support per-
sonalized and informal learning. In the e-learning domain we are increasingly 
seeing a move from a world of VLEs (Virtual Learning Environments) into a 
space where students are taking more control of their learning in the form of 
PLEs (Personal Learning Environments), either as monolithic applications to 
help students manage their resources and time, or as a collection of online tools 
(such as Google calendar to manage time, 43 Things to manage goals, etc). In 
this personalized learning context, agent technology becomes even more appro-
priate because agents are good at representing the requirements of users, and 
negotiating a personalized experience. There is also a lot of potential to support 
informal learning, because in a decentralized agent system there is no need for a 
central authority (such as a tutor or academic institution) to orchestrate col-
laborations and learning activities. 
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Agent technologies could allow us to take this personalization to new lev-
els. For example, consider an online university that has open enrolment for 
adult learners to work towards a qualification (or a given set of skills needed for 
a particular job). Adults seek courses to match their own requirements, but the 
university can only run courses that attract sufficiently high interest. The situ-
ation can be more complicated by existing restrictions on which courses might 
run, due to the overheads of running too many courses, or adding dependencies 
between courses. In the context of personalized learning, where students take 
control of their learning, we would like the decision about which courses are run 
to be made collectively by the students, while taking into account their indi-
vidual preferences. A voting procedure combined with an agent framework is a 
powerful technology for tackling this complexity and producing fexible course 
selection systems. They enable students and the university to collectively decide 
which courses will run. 
This kind of intelligent and personalized e-learning system means that differ-
ent students can have different experiences since tasks and resources are intelli-
gently modified according to their preferences (Shute and Paotica 1994). This 
means intelligent e-learning systems must face the issue of fairness, where fair-
ness is broadly defined as ensuring for any given process participants are treat-
ed equally and there is an appropriate balance of satisfaction with the outcome. 
In this thesis we are interested in determining whether or not agent tech-
nology and voting procedures can be used to solve this e-learning scenario, but 
also what the consequences are for fairness to the student involved. We present 
a multi-agent simulation for this e-learning scenario, based on voting theory 
(where the number of candidates corresponds to the number of courses availa-
ble that a student can vote for), where an autonomous software agent votes on 
a student’s behalf according to the student’s preferences. In this context, the 
agent votes on a student’s behalf to automate the voting process and to assist 
the student in making voting decisions. In particular, the reasons for using 
agents are because there will be multiple rounds of voting, and in each round 
one of the courses is cancelled. In such a setting, it would be very inconvenient 
for a student to participate by voting every time when course is cancelled. More 
importantly, through these rounds, an agent can learn from the information 
provided in previous rounds and predict what could happen to make a decision. 
We first explore a simple model of student preferences where the student 
specifies a rating for each course, and then extend the voting system to deal 
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with more complex preferences. In particular, we discuss the situation that 
takes into account interdependencies between the available courses. In this con-
text the need for a decentralised, agent-based solution is even more pronounced 
since it is difficult to collect and process such preferences in a centralised way. 
This is because, first of all, each agent can have different constraints and inter-
dependencies between courses, which can be difficult to express in a uniform 
manner. Second, computing an optimal centralised solution when there are such 
constraints and interdependencies is a computationally difficult task. Both of 
these problems are addressed by using a voting system, where the task of ex-
pressing preferences and casting votes is transferred to the individual agent, 
thereby enabling a higher degree of flexibility. In particular, each agent can use 
different preference representations and voting strategies, depending on the 
needs of the individual user, without requiring the voting protocol to change. 
Another advantage of this approach compared to a centralised approach, is that 
the users do not need to reveal their preferences, but these are kept private and 
are only known by the individual agent representing the user.   
Having a decentralised system where each agent can choose its own strategy 
raises the issue of fairness, since agents with very intelligent strategies could 
potentially have an advantage over simpler or naïve strategies. As a result, in 
this thesis we consider various notions of fairness, and see through agent-based 
simulations whether our system meets these fairness criteria. Furthermore, we 
consider modifications to the voting protocol and the effect on fairness.  
1.1 Research Hypotheses 
Given the above scenario, the hypotheses of this thesis are stated as follows: 
H1: In an eLearning scenario such as academic course selection, a decen-
tralised agent system using a voting protocol can achieve a comparable level 
level of overall student satisfaction as an optimal centralised approach while 
maintaining levels of privacy and choice. 
 Academic course selection. In many educational organizations 
there exist restrictions on which courses might run, due to the over-
heads of running too many courses. They must somehow determine 
which set of courses to run. This is a common scenario with Higher 
Education degree courses, where students are often offered a number 
of courses and for economic reasons only the most popular courses 
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are run. In the context of personalized learning, students take more 
control of their learning, and would like to collectively make the deci-
sion about which courses are run, whilst taking into account their in-
dividual preferences. 
 Voting protocol. A set of rules that governs how votes are cast in 
an election, how they are aggregated, and how winners are deter-
mined. 
 Student satisfaction. This measures how well the courses that are 
chosen to run match the preferences of an individual student. 
H2: Within system with complex preferences, an individual student that uses 
an intelligent predictive strategy will on average achieve a higher satisfac-
tion than those taking a naïve or random strategy. 
 Intelligent predictive strategy. This strategy is included as an exam-
ple of what can be achieved with a more sophisticated strategy that 
learns as the voting procedure progresses from one round to the next. Its 
effectiveness can be gauged by comparing it to others strategies (called 
Proportional strategy and Equal-Share strategy). The main idea behind 
this strategy is that, in each round, the agent tries to predict the proba-
bility that a course will be cancelled based on the number of points cur-
rently awarded to each course from previous rounds. Then, from this 
probability, it can calculate its expected satisfaction for a given allocation 
of points, and it will allocate the points such that the expected satisfac-
tion is maximized. 
 Naïve strategy. A strategy that is simple but sensible. It behaves simp-
ly when dealing with tasks. Consequently, it provides a good benchmark 
that can be used to compare the performance of more sophisticated strat-
egies. In this research, the naïve strategy is given name called Propor-
tional strategy. The main idea behind a proportional strategy is that the 
student agent distributes its points proportionally to the student’s prefer-
ences for each course. 
 Random strategy. A very simple and ineffective strategy. This strategy 
behaves without any particular complicated method when dealing with 
points. It provides a good lower bound on the performance of system. An 
Equal-Share strategy is based on the principle that give all courses an 
equal number of votes, regardless of the student’s preference. 
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H3: As the proportion of individual agents utilising differently performing 
strategies in the system increases, the overall fairness of the result (as de-
fined by equity theory) decreases. 
 Fairness of the result. In this context, fairness is broadly defined as 
ensuring that, for any given process, participants are treated equally and 
there is an appropriate balance of satisfaction with the outcome. 
 Equity theory. This is the idea that fairness is based on the allocation 
of resources (in a society) based on the contribution of individuals; so, for 
example, in a fair society input efforts and reward outputs are balanced 
(Adams 1966). 
H4: When having a uniform mixture of different strategies we can ad-
just the protocol by exponent and weight to make the protocol fairer. 
 Uniformly mixed strategy cohort. A population of agents using dif-
ferent voting strategies, and where each strategy is equally represented. 
 Adjusting the protocol. The system is adjusted in two ways: exponent 
and weight. Exponent is to give an individual student agent that rates 
courses highly more impact than a student agent that rates the courses 
lower. In other words, students who have stronger preferences are more 
important to the system than the others. As a result, the system responds 
to those with extreme views and takes their preferences into account 
when dealing with courses. Weight is to give a boost to the student 
who has not achieved their desire, and makes them have a more success-
ful impact on the voting process. In other words, the points of a less hap-
py student will become greater by multiplying his returned points by the 
weight. 
1.2 Contributions 
This thesis investigates the use of agent technology as an approach to solving a 
number of problems concerned with personalized learning. With the methodolo-
gy and findings of this thesis, the key contributions are as follows: 
 We implement an e-learning scenario using multi-agent systems 
where agents communicate to achieve autonomous goals. 
 We introduce an agent voting protocol for individuals to vote for a 
limited set of resources, consisting of multiple rounds that allow the 
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student agent to accurately represent the student’s preferences and 
learn from previous rounds. 
 We present three new e-learning scenarios that are not possible with 
today’s technology to show how common problem solving techniques 
in the agent world (voting systems, coalition formation and auction 
systems) could map to problems in e-learning in terms of decentrali-
zation and personalization. 
 We investigate whether voting procedures in particular, and multi-
agent technology in general, could potentially replace a centralised 
infrastructure where the selection of courses is determined directly by 
the central authority, and explore the impact of agents using differ-
ent strategies. 
 We demonstrate the potential of using multi-agent systems and vot-
ing in settings where students have complex preferences (substituta-
ble and complementary). 
 We introduce a simple framework for measuring fairness by three dif-
ferent notions of fairness (Utilitarianism, Equalitarianism and Egali-
tarianism). 
 We use this framework to explore the issue of fairness in intelligent e-
learning systems, where different students can have different experi-
ences as tasks and resources are intelligently modified according to 
their preferences. 
1.3 Document Structure 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. This section provides a summary of 
the content of each one. 
Chapter 2 introduces agent technology, with particular focus on approach-
es that can be used in the area of multi-agent systems. To this end, agent char-
acteristic and framework are reviewed. This chapter also describes the voting 
approaches and their relevance to agent technology. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the literature relating to this work in the 
area of technology and education. Specifically, it introduces intelligent ap-
proaches for e-learning and gives details about their definitions and architec-
ture. It then discusses personalised learning, focusing on its need and technolo-
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gy that can support it. It then goes on to show different systems which are 
supported by agent technology. . The chapter ends by presenting three scenari-
os that show how solutions from the agent domain might be used to solve prob-
lems from the e-learning domain in a novel way. 
Chapter 4 describes the architecture of the multi-agent system simulation 
that is used to conduct this research. It also describes the voting protocol that 
is being used by the system, and how the preferences of students are modelled. 
Finally, it presents three different voting strategies. 
Chapter 5 describes the first set of experiments, which investigates wheth-
er voting procedures used with multi-agent technology could potentially replace 
a centralized infrastructure, where the decision is made directly by the central 
authority. To this end, it compares the output obtained by the different strate-
gies with the optimal solution. It then shows the impact of the different agent 
strategies on the overall student satisfaction. 
Chapter 6 describes the second set of experiments, which demonstrates 
the potential of using multi-agent systems and voting in settings where stu-
dents have complex preferences, such as complementary and substitutable pref-
erences between courses. As in Chapter 5, it shows the impact of using a range 
of voting strategies on overall student satisfaction. 
Chapter 7 describes the third set of experiments, which investigates the is-
sue of fairness, where individuals use different strategies in intelligent agent-
based e-learning systems that provide personalisation. It first introduces a sim-
ple framework for measuring the fairness of a result derived from the literature, 
and sets fairness definitions with formal metrics. It then shows how to use this 
framework to examine the results of the agent simulation and look at the fair-
ness of different student strategies as measured by the metrics. It also discusses 
the fairness of the protocol by including factors that make the protocol fairer by 
rewarding people very highly or rewarding people who do not succeed at first 
Chapter 8 concludes and summarises the work contained within the thesis 
and links them to the findings achieved. It ends with interesting directions for 
future work. 
 
 
 
 8 
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  Chapter 2.
Agent Technology  
Agent technology is considered an important and promising approach to devel-
oping industrial distributed systems and enterprise collaboration (Jennings, 
Corera et al. 1995). This chapter explains agent technology. It starts by provid-
ing background, with a particular focus on the definitions of agent and multi-
agent systems, discussing some of their characteristics and describing a number 
of key agent frameworks. It then goes on to explain how multiagent systems 
can make a collective decision using social choice theory. It also presents a re-
lated area, voting systems, which are sets of rules that determine how decisions 
are reached, summarising some common voting systems. The chapter then dis-
cusses the notion of fairness, with a focus on different type of fairness, also dis-
cussing the importance of fairness when constructing a decentralised system. 
Finally, it concludes by summarising the information presented.  
2.1 Agent based systems 
The term agent has been widely used in a number of technologies, for example, 
in artificial intelligence, databases, operating systems and the marketplace. Alt-
hough there is no unique definition of agent technology, researchers in the field 
agree that an agent has autonomy (Bellifemine, Caire et al. 2007). Wooldridge 
and Jennings (1995) provide one of the most common definitions. They define 
an agent as “a computer system situated in some environment, that is capable 
of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives” 
(Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). In this context, autonomy means the agent 
should be able to “act without the intervention of humans or other agents, and 
should have control over its own actions and internal state”. 
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An agent is considered to be intelligent if an agent is capable of flexible 
autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives. Flexibility means the 
agent is expected to have the following capabilities (Wooldridge 2009):   
Reactivity: Intelligent agents should perceive their environment and re-
spond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it in order to satisfy their 
design objectives. 
Proactivity: Intelligent agents should be able to take appropriate initia-
tives rather than simply taking action in response to the environment in order 
to satisfy their design objectives.  
Sociability: Intelligent agents should be able to interact, when they deem 
appropriate, with other agents and humans in order to satisfy their design ob-
jectives.  
A multiagent system (MAS) is a collection of autonomous agents situated 
within the same environment that carry out their activities in order to solve 
given problems beyond the capabilities of individual agents (Jennings, Sycara et 
al. 1998). Agents have their own goals. Therefore, agents interact with each 
other within the multi-agent system to achieve an end objective or to improve 
their performance. A key pattern of interaction in multi-agent systems involves 
a form of coordination, both in cooperative and competitive agents (Weiss 
1999). In the case of cooperative multi-agent systems, several decentralised 
agents try to combine their efforts to collectively accomplish the goals that the 
individual agents cannot (that is, each agent tries to maximise the utility of the 
whole system). In the case of competitive multi-agent systems, agents have 
their own goals and preferences (that is, agents try to maximise their own utili-
ty, regardless of the effects on the other agents’ utilities). Agents in this design 
are also called “self-interested”. In some cases, a self-interested agent may effec-
tively act in a coordinated manner by applying rules, such as voting rules, to 
reach collective goals (see section 2.4.1). 
2.2 Why Agent Based Systems?  
Agent technology is considered an important and promising approach to devel-
oping industrial distributed systems and enterprise collaboration (Jennings, 
Corera et al. 1995). Agent technologies can reduce the complexity of systems 
that handle complex problems (Shen, Hao et al. 2006). Milgrom et al. (2001) 
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have illustrated instances where the usage of software agent technology can be 
useful (Milgrom, Chainho et al. 2001): 
Need for Distributed Control 
Some problems are too complex for a single monolithic solution, but most de-
signers and implementers find it difficult to design and build distributed solu-
tions. Decentralising control in a distributed system can solve responsibility, 
privacy and physical constraints. Here, a multiagent system acting inde-
pendently can be used to control each part of the distributed system.  Brennan 
et al. (2002) developed their distributed intelligent control approach that ena-
bles control over widely distributed devices in an environment that is prone to 
disruptions. With this model, control is achieved by the many simple, autono-
mous, and cooperative entities that are based on the principles of agent-based 
systems (Brennan, Fletcher et al. 2002). 
Need to concurrently achieve multiple, possibly conflicting, goals  
A number of systems face situations where it is not possible to specify their be-
haviour on a case-by-case basis because it is not possible to foresee at the de-
sign stage all of the situations that are going to happen during the planned sys-
tem stage. In these cases, it is much easier to specify a series of goals to be 
achieved (Riemsdijk, Dastani et al. 2008). Agent systems are good approaches 
for this type of system, since agent technology solves this problem by defining 
how to decide what to do instead of mapping inputs to outputs by defining 
what to do. This is useful when there are many alternative ways to achieve a 
goal. The approach leads to more flexible systems that can adapt their behav-
iour to changing circumstances, so as to satisfy the goals for which they are re-
sponsible (Milgrom, Chainho et al. 2001). For example, Adams et al. (2008) de-
veloped a system for disaster management that is comprised of autonomous 
agents that can sense and act in order to achieve collective goals.  It is a decen-
tralised control system and as such is more flexible and can respond more 
quickly to new information related to disasters (Adams, Field et al. 2008). 
Need for Autonomous behaviour 
Systems acting on behalf of a user may be designed to take action only when 
prompted by an explicit request. However, it is more efficient if they attempt to 
satisfy their assigned goals without the need for explicit requests. Autonomous 
behaviour can help manage a substantial workload, as well as having the ability 
to take on tasks that are too complex for a human (Gillies and Ballin 2004). 
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Agent-based systems can behave autonomously more easily than other systems 
built using traditional techniques. Agent-based systems implement applications 
as networks of autonomous agents. 
Need for Flexibility and Adaptability 
In systems that have a purpose that is expected to evolve, the system may need 
to be significantly expanded or modified during operation. They are more deal-
ing with environments that are unpredictable and changeable like robots 
(Bernon, Gleizes et al. 2003). In other cases, the system’s knowledge of its envi-
ronment is expected to increase, and subsequently the system is expected to 
adapt its behaviour. Software agents are considered an efficient approach due 
to their intrinsic modularity. Therefore, agents can be easily added or replaced, 
reducing maintenance costs in relation to the overall system. 
Need for Interoperability 
A software agent-oriented approach can be considered if the system needs to 
interact with software that is unknown during the design process. Multiagent 
systems can provide services beyond their individual capabilities and have the 
capability to exchange and interact with information, as well as provide a flexi-
ble and dynamically cooperative model in a cooperative intelligent design envi-
ronment (Zhao, Deng et al. 2001). Moreover, they can improve the interopera-
bility among applications and build up high-level autonomous cooperation 
(Suguri, Kodama et al. 2003). 
2.3 Agent Frameworks 
An Agent framework is an architecture providing the environment in which 
agents can actively exist, operate and communicate with each other using ap-
propriate protocols to achieve their goals (Leszczyna 2004). The agent frame-
work supports three features for agent developers creation: the ability to create 
and run agents within particular environment. Communication: supports agent-
to-agent communication using speech acts. Discovery: allows agents to find new 
agents using a service based discovery mechanism (Bailey 2002). 
There are a number of different multiagent frameworks available that 
have been used by researchers. Some frameworks will be explained in this sec-
tion. 
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JADE 
Java Agent Development Framework (JADE) is Java-based agent framework. 
It is open source and provides middleware-layer functionalities. It was one of 
the early systems to support the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents 
(FIPA) specifications (Bailey 2002; Bellifemine, Caire et al. 2007). 
JADE was implemented to simplify the development of agent applica-
tions. It provides programmers with the following functionalities (Bellifemine, 
Caire et al. 2007): 
 A fully distributed system: each agent runs as a separate thread on 
different remote mechanisms, i.e. the underlying communication in-
frastructure is abstracted by a unique location-independent API. 
 Full compliance with FIPA: the framework efficiently participates in 
all FIPA interoperability. 
 Efficient transport of asynchronous messages via a location-
transparent API: the platform can select the best available way to 
communicate.  
 Support for agent mobility: the agent can migrate between processes 
and machines. That migration allows the communicating agent to 
continue to interact. 
 Support for ontologies and content languages: Ontology is preformed 
automatically by the platform to be used by the programmers direct-
ly. Also programmers can implement a new ontology to satisfy appli-
cation requirements.  
Within the JADE framework, there is a platform consisting of agent con-
tainers that can be distributed over the network. Containers run within a single 
JVM platform, providing the JADE run-time as well as all services needed for 
executing each JADE agent. There is a special container called the main con-
tainer, which is the first container to be launched. All other containers must 
join the main container by registering with it (Bellifemine, Caire et al. 2007). 
SoFAR 
The Southampton Framework for Agent Research (SoFAR) is an early agent 
framework developed at the University of Southampton. It was designed to 
provide an environment for a distributed information management agent com-
municating over communications infrastructure. In SoFAR, agents run within a 
platform, which is a single JVM environment. Each platform contains registry 
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agents that maintain a list of services that each agent provides within the plat-
form. Agents connect with the registry when they want to advertise a set of 
services they offer. Consequently, if an agent requires any services from another 
within the platform, it must first query the registry to acquire the services.  
The communication model in SoFAR is based on an existing agent lan-
guage, such as FIPA. With these services, SoFAR provides the necessary infra-
structure needed to rapidly develop autonomous, proactive and socially aware 
agents (Moreau, Gibbins et al. 2000) (Bailey 2002). 
JATLite   
JATLite (Java Agent Template, Lite) was created by the Computer Science 
Department at Stanford University. It is a collection of Java packages designed 
to allow the user to create software agents that communicate across the inter-
net. JATLite is based on the Typed Messages Agents mechanism, where 
an agent is defined as a part of communities that perform a distributed compu-
tation using typed messages. JATLite provides basic communication tools that 
exchange KQML messages through TCP/IP (Jeon, Petrie et al. 2000).  
JATLite provides a basic infrastructure in which agents register with an 
Agent Message Router. An Agent Message Router is a specialised application 
which receives a message from the registered agents and routes it to the correct 
receiver. It enables an agent to  connect or disconnect  to the Internet, transfer 
files with the FTP protocol, and exchange information with other agents run-
ning on different computers (Ugurlu and Erdogan 2000). In particular, all 
agents send and receive messages via the Router, which acts  like  an  email  
server  and  forwards  messages  onto  the  receiver. If an agent disconnects, or 
accidentally crashes, the message router will buffer the message until the receiv-
ing agent resumes its contact with the router. In this, agents are allowed to dis-
connect, migrate to a new location and then reconnect to the Router to   re-
ceive   their   messages (Bailey 2002). 
JACK 
JACK Intelligent Agents (JACK) were developed by Agent Oriented Software 
Pty. Ltd. (AOS), a commercial Java-based environment for developing and 
running multi-agent applications (AOS 2011). The JACK framework can pro-
vide a high level of performance and incorporates the Belief-Desire-Intention 
(BDI) reasoning model. JACK can be easily extended to support different agent 
models or specific application requirements. It consists of architecture-
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independent facilities, plus a set of plug-in components that address the re-
quirements of specific agent architectures (Busetta, Rönnquist et al. 
1999).  Each agent is defined in terms of its goals, knowledge and social capa-
bility, and is then left to perform its function autonomously within the envi-
ronment it was designed to function in (AOS 2011). 
Jason 
Jason is the interpreter for our extended version of AgentSpeak, which allows 
the running of a multi-agent system distributed over a net. Jason was very 
much directed towards using AgentSpeak as the basis and providing various 
extensions that are required for the practical development of multi-agent sys-
tems. It is implemented in Java and is open source (Bordini and Hübner 2006). 
AgentSpeak is logic programming for the BDI agent architecture and provides 
an elegant abstract framework for programming BDI agents (Alechina, Bordini 
et al. 2006).  
Bordini et al. identfied some of the features available in Jason (Bordini, 
Hübner et al. 2007): 
 Speech-act based inter-agent communication and annotation of be-
liefs with information sources; 
 Annotations on plan labels, which can be used by elaborate selection 
functions; 
 The possibility to run a multi-agent system distributed over a net-
work using SACI; 
 Fully customisable (in Java) selection functions, trust functions, and 
overall agent architecture (perception, belief-revision, inter-agent 
communication, and acting); 
 Straightforward extensibility (and use of ) by means of user-defined; 
and  
 Clear notion of multi-agent environments, which can be implemented 
in Java (this can be a simulation of a real environment). 
 
dMARS  
The distributed Multi-Agent Reasoning System (dMARS) is the best-known 
implementation of the PRS architecture using the theoretical foundations of the 
BDI. The dMARS agent consists of a set of beliefs, desires, plan and intentions 
 16 
(d'Inverno, Kinny et al. 1998). It stores its beliefs in a relational database, 
along with all its information about the world (Jain, Ichalkaranje et al. 2002). 
In dMARS agents, the BDI model is operationalised by plans and each agent 
has a plan library. 
D'Inverno et al. summarised the operation of the dMARS agent, which 
executes the following cycle (D'Inverno, Luck et al. 2004): 
 Observe the agent’s internal state and the world and, based on 
that, update the event queue to reflect the events that have been 
observed;  
 Find plans whose condition matches an event; this generates possi-
ble desires; 
 From this set of matching plans, select one for execution (an in-
tended means); 
 Push the intended means onto an existing or new intention stack, 
according to the event whether or not it is a sub-goal; 
 Take the topmost plan (intended means) from the intention stack, 
and execute the next step of this current plan; 
 If the step is an action, perform it; 
 Otherwise, if it is a sub-goal, post this sub-goal to the event queue. 
 
Repast 
Repast is a software framework for agent simulation. It is a free open-source 
toolkit developed at the University of Chicago. It is an integrated library of 
classes for running and displaying date the created based on agent simulation 
(Collier 2003). It works as a collection of agents that controls the agent’s be-
haviours according to the schedule. This schedule controls the actions within 
the agent model, such as updating and recording data (Tatara, Çınar et al. 
2007). 
North and Macal reviewed the main features of Repast. It is fully object-
oriented and can be developed in many languages, including Lava, C# and 
Visual Basic.Net. It also supports sequential and parallel event operation, 
whereby a concurrent discrete event scheduler is used. In addition, Repast of-
fers built-in simulation result logging and graphing tools that allow users to ac-
cess and modify agent properties such as agent behaviour at run time. It in-
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cludes libraries for genetic algorithms, neural networks and specialised mathe-
matics (North and Macal 2005). 
2.4 Social choice theory 
Social choice theory is a way of analysing collective decision making. It consid-
ers the opinions or values of the members of a given community or society as a 
preference (given that the preferences of people may conflict), and attempts to 
make a collective choice or a judgement based on those preferences (Craven 
1992; Gaertner 2006). It is available in pure Java or Microsoft.Net forms. 
In technologies requiring a mechanism for collective decision making, such 
as artificial intelligence and computer science more broadly, there is a need to 
study computational social choice mechanisms such as fair division algorithms 
or voting procedures (Chevaleyre, Endriss et al. 2007). Computational social 
choice theory is concerned with importing concepts from social choice theory 
and applying them to artificial intelligence and computer science. For example, 
social choice theory was originally developed to study preference aggregation 
mechanisms and collective decisions made by humans. Similarly is the case for 
multi-agent systems in order to manage societies of autonomous software agents 
and make collective decisions (Chevaleyre, Endriss et al. 2008).  
In multiagent systems, social choice theory is an active area of research 
that enables decentralised decisions. This field has increasingly been an area of 
investigation for researchers of multiagent systems over the last two decades 
(Lang 2004; Procaccia 2008). Researchers in the field have considered social 
choice theory as highlighting fresh issues, given that the computational features 
of some problems need collective decisions (Chevaleyre, Endriss et al. 2008).  
When different agents have different preferences within a multi-agent sys-
tem, it is important to find a way to aggregate these preferences. Although 
agents can be competitive, having independent motivations, goals or perspec-
tives, they still need to be reconciled and to come to a consensus (Rosenschein 
and Procaccia 2006). 
Designers of multi-agent systems are concerned with analysing and design-
ing the mechanisms needed for collective decision making, as agents are inher-
ently autonomous and may have conflicting goals. Meanwhile, each agent would 
like to maximise its utility. Voting systems are one way for multiagent systems 
to choose one out of a set of possible decisions. Each agent expresses its prefer-
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ences of the possible decisions, and a voting system aggregates these preferences 
to determine the collective decision (Rossi, Venable et al. 2011). Therefore, a 
voting system provides an efficient way to make socially collective decision 
while taking individual preferences into account (Wooldridge 2009).  
2.4.1 Voting systems 
Voting systems are appropriate for reaching socially desirable decisions that 
take individual preferences into account (Wooldridge 2009). A voting system 
applies a set of rules that govern how votes are cast in an election, how they 
are aggregated, and how winners are determined (Laruelle and Valenciano 
2008). There are many voting procedures: 
Plurality voting: Everyone casts a single vote. The candidate with the 
most votes wins. In this system, known as first past the post, each voter has 
one vote and the single candidate who receives the most votes, irrespective of 
the percentage of these votes among the total number of votes cast, is declared 
the winner. 
Cumulative voting: Each voter is given   votes, which can be cast in a 
distributed way. Several votes can be cast to one candidate, and the remaining 
of the votes can be distributed across other candidates. The candidate with the 
most votes wins (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). Here, each voter receives a 
number of points (sometime the number of points is equal to the number of 
candidates and sometime not), and they are free to choose how many points to 
allocate to each candidate. The candidates with the highest cumulative points 
are selected as winners. This allows voters to express their intensities of prefer-
ence rather than simply to rank candidates (Brams 1991) 
Single transferable vote (STV): This rule proceeds through a series of 
m-1 rounds.  In each round, the candidate with the lowest plurality score is 
eliminated and each of the votes for that candidate transfers to the next re-
maining candidate in the order given in that vote.  The candidates are ranked 
in reverse order of elimination (Conitzer and Sandholm 2005). In (STV) system, 
each voter provides a ranked list of candidates according to its preferences.  
The winner determination process proceeds in several rounds. In each round, all 
votes for the most preferred candidate are counted, and the candidate who has 
received the least number of votes is eliminated. Then, anyone who has voted 
for the eliminated candidate as their first preference now has their second pref-
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erence allocated as their first preference. The process then repeats until the re-
quired number of winners remains. The aim of this procedure is to minimise 
wasted votes and to promote proportional representation. 
Plurality with run-off: This voting procedure is a variation of STV. In 
the first round all candidates are eliminated except the two with the highest 
plurality vote. Then votes are transferred to these as in the STV rule. In second 
round the winner is determined from these two. Candidates are ranked accord-
ing to Plurality scores with the exception of the top two candidates; the winner 
is determined according to the runoff (Zuckerman, Faliszewski et al. 2011). 
Borda Count: this voting method allows each voter to rank candidates 
in order on preferences. This ordering contributes points to each candidate 
based on the position that he ranked by the voter.  If there are   candidates, it 
contributes     points to first place ranked candidate,     points to the se-
cond, and so on. It contributes no points to the lowest ranked candidate. The 
winner is the one with the highest points (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). 
This work introduces a novel voting procedure that combines features 
from both STV and cumulative voting. Specifically, we take advantage of the 
features of cumulative voting to express the preferences by using points while 
allowing for multiple rounds in order to avoid wastage due to transferring 
points akin to the STV method. Having multiple rounds also allows a student 
to learn from previous rounds and to adjust voting behaviour accordingly. The 
details of our voting procedure are presented in Section 4.3. 
2.4.2 Combinatorial preferences 
Combinatorial preferences mostly have been studied within the context of com-
binatorial auctions. However, there are a couple of papers that have considered 
such preferences in a voting setting. Specifically, combinatorial voting has been 
studied by Lang (Lang 2004; Lang 2008). In Lang’s work, agents are assumed 
to vote for given bundles of candidates. Since enumerating all possible combina-
tions of candidates is typically infeasible, the main problem becomes which of 
these bundles should be selected by the system and voted on by the agents.   
In terms of representing preferences, a number of languages have been in-
troduced in both combinatorial voting and auctions. Some of these languages 
are tailored to represent cardinal preferences while others represent ordinal 
preferences.  With regard to the nature of the language itself, some of the lan-
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guages are graphical (such as CP-net or GAI-net) and some others are based on 
propositional logic (such as bidding languages for combinatorial auctions) 
(Boutilier and Hoos 2001). Expressing preferences that allows agents to specify 
preferences concisely and clearly include the OR-language and XOR-language 
from the combinatorial auctions field (Uckelman and Endriss 2008). In the OR-
language, the valuation of a bundle is taken to be the maximal value that can 
be obtained when computing the sum over disjoint bids for subsets of the bun-
dle, while in the XOR-language, at most one bundle can be counted and the 
valuation of a bundle is simply the highest value offered for any of its subsets 
(Chevaleyre, Endriss et al. 2008). Conitzer (Conitzer 2010) shows  an example 
to illustrate the mechanism  behind these languages. For OR-language, assume 
the  bid as following  ( { a } , 3) OR ( { b,c } , 4) OR ( { c,d } , 5). This bid 
indicates that if the bidder receives the bundle { a,b,c } , his value is 7 (because 
he computes the sum over his bids); if he receives { b, c, d } , his utility is 5 
(each of the last two bundles in his bid are contained in the bundle he  receives, 
but c can only be counted towards one of them, and the last bundle has the 
greater valuation). For example, the bid ( { a } , 3) XOR ( { b,c } ,4) XOR ( 
{ c, d } ,5) indicates that the bidder’s value for { a,b,c } is 4 (only one of the 
first two bundles can be counted). In this language, any valuation function can 
be expressed (if necessary, by XOR-ing all possible bundles together). 
This thesis work uses the same principle as the languages discussed above, 
but limits the number of combinations to only consider interdependencies be-
tween two courses. In particular, we model two types of relationships: comple-
mentary (AND) and substitute (OR). We describe that in more details in Sec-
tion 6.1. 
2.5 Fairness 
It is important to consider fairness concepts when constructing decentralised 
systems (Wierzbicki 2010). These systems usually consist of independent agents 
interacting with one another. Subsequently, agents make decisions under a de-
gree of uncertainty and the decision of others’ influences the outcomes of indi-
vidual agents. Furthermore, the lack of central authority makes it difficult to 
prevent conflict.  
Typically, multi-agent systems are designed on the assumption that they 
consist of rational, self-interested agents. However, some agents need to work 
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collaboratively to reach their common goals.  This is similar to social welfare, 
where all agents are trying to maximise the outcome for the whole society.  
In these circumstances, agents working together as a whole system need to 
take fairness into account, otherwise they may not reach their intended goals. 
This is because the problems lies in controlling the behaviour of individual 
agents working in a way that enables the whole system to reach a certain goal 
(Jong, Tuyls et al. 2008).  
In politics, fairness is often applied to social welfare or the political pro-
cess. Equity theory is the idea that fairness is based on the allocation of re-
sources (in a society) based on the contribution of individuals. For example, in 
a fair society input efforts and reward outputs are balanced (Adams 1966). Eq-
uity theory, therefore, concentrates on the outcomes of a system and judges 
whether they are fair based on the actions of the individuals involved. Never-
theless, equity theory has  been criticised for not taking into account the (po-
tentially unbalanced) differing needs of individuals and for not considering the 
process itself (Leventhal 1976). In mathematics, fairness is also used to describe 
outcomes. For example, the theory of fair division, states that any allocation of 
resources is fair if any other division that makes one of the participants better 
off  makes at least one of them worse off, and also if every participant subjec-
tively feels himself to be better off than anyone else (Weller 1985). Rabin 
(1993) extended this idea to one of fairness equilibria, a balanced state of fair-
ness within a game situation, in which players are helping those that help them 
and hurting those that hurt them (Rabin 1993).  
Fairness has different general types. The two most common types identi-
fied by social psychology are distributive fairness and procedural fairness 
(Folger and Konovsky 1989; Tyler 2000). Distributive fairness focuses on giving 
all member of the society a fair share from available benefits and resources. 
However, people have different views on what constitutes a fair distribution. 
While some believe in equity principles, others believe in equality principles and 
others on need principles (Wagstaff 1994). Under the principle of equity, people 
should receive a share proportional to their contributions and efforts. Under the 
principle of equality, people should receive equal shares regardless of their in-
puts and actions. Under the principle of need, distribution is based on need, 
with those needing more receiving more (Deutsch 1975; Maiese 2003). 
Procedural fairness is concerned with making and implementing decisions 
according to fair processes, thereby ensuring fair treatment. Procedural justice 
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focuses on the means used to determine and shape the outcome (Folger and 
Konovsky 1989). Thus, applying a fair procedure will often generate a fair out-
come. Tyler (2000) says people are more willing to accept decisions when they 
feel this decision was made using procedures they view to be fair. Therefore, 
procedural fairness is a proper mechanism for resolving social conflicts as it fo-
cuses on the rules that produce fair decisions (Tyler 2000). 
Fairness is based upon notions of justice that can help codify the main 
principles in terms of satisfaction values, where an agent’s satisfaction value is a 
numerical representation of how satisfied that agent is with a given outcome.  
Utilitarian: is the belief that the best outcome is the one that gives the 
greatest whole welfare to society, where whole welfare is measured by summing 
the welfare for all individuals (Myerson 1981). In terms of agent satisfaction 
values this would mean maximising the mean satisfaction of all participants. 
Equalitarian: is the belief that the best outcome is the one that gives the 
least difference between the individual members of society (Dworkin 1981). In 
terms of agent satisfaction values this would mean minimising the standard de-
viation of satisfaction values, and minimising the range of satisfaction values. 
The problem with equality is that you can achieve perfect equality regardless of 
overall satisfaction, drawing no difference between a system where no one is 
satisfied and another where everyone is satisfied.  
Egalitarian: is the belief that the best outcome is one that gives the  
greatest  overall welfare subject to the restraint that all individual members 
should have equal benefits, rights and opportunities from society (Myerson 
1981). An Egalitarian principle would therefore be to maximise the welfare of a 
society’s weakest member (Endriss, Maudet et al. 2003). In terms of agent satis-
faction values, this would mean maximising the minimum satisfaction. Max-
imising the median satisfaction is another approach (to ensure that the lowest 
half of the satisfaction values is as high as possible). 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a background to agent technology showing defini-
tions, features and usage of multi agent systems, and discussing some of their 
characteristics and showing some agent frameworks. It then has showed how 
social choice theory can use some voting rules to manage numbers of autono-
mous software agents having different preferences and make collective decisions. 
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This chapter also has included an overview of voting systems, and summarising 
some common voting systems. The chapter then has discussed the fairness no-
tion, with a focus on different type of fairness. 
Having covered the relevant background and issues as entrance to this 
this thesis, the next chapter will describe related work of technology and educa-
tion focusing on personalized and informal learning and the existing use of 
agent technology in e-learning. 
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  Chapter 3.
Technology and Education 
Using technology to support learning is increasingly popular. Nowadays, tech-
nology is integrated into the learning environment and used as one of important 
options to support learning (NAEYC 1996). The design of technologies tools 
such as Web 2.0 have changed learning environments in ways that increase the 
possibility for more interactions between learners and facilitate access to a vari-
ety of learning material. Moreover, the creation and extension of various intelli-
gent technologies, such as agent technology and web services, can support flexi-
bility in e-learning.  
In order to investigate the feasibility and impact of a multi-agent ap-
proach in e-learning, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of several re-
search areas. This chapter starts by giving an overview of e-learning in general, 
with a focus on its definition and different stages through its history and a 
comparison of the characteristics of each period. Then, it introduces intelligent 
approaches for e-learning, Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) and Adaptive 
Hypermedia (AH), giving details about their definitions, architecture and role 
in e-learning. This is followed by a detailed survey and discussion of personal-
ised learning, with attention paid to its definitions, needs, and some technolo-
gies that can support it. This chapter shows how agent technology can be ap-
plied to tackle challenges in educational environments by presenting different 
systems which are supported by agent technology. Finally, this chapter goes on 
to illustrate three different e-learning scenarios showing how agent technologies 
could be used. Each scenario is composed of a description of the scenario and 
an analysis of the agent solutions that make the scenarios possible.  
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3.1 E-learning 
E-learning is nowadays one of the most interesting of the e-domains available 
through the Internet (Anghel and Salomie 2003) and has the potential to over-
come some traditional learning limitations such as fixed times and locations for 
learning. E-learning offers new ways for both learners and educators to enrich 
their learning and teaching experiences through their learning environments. It 
enables learning to take place at any time at any location, and also supports 
the exploration and application of information, as well as the promotion of new 
knowledge (Holmes and Gardner 2006). 
There may be many definitions within the context of e-learning but they 
all focus on the same functions and features. The European Commission and 
the E-learning Action Plan defines e-learning as “the use of new multimedia 
technologies and the Internet to improve the quality of learning by facilitating 
access to resources and services as well as remote exchanges and collaboration” 
(CEC 2001). Another definition by the American Society of Training and eDu-
cations (ASTD) states: “E-learning is the application of digital media by the 
learner in the learning process, where digital media includes the Internet, corpo-
rate networks, computers, satellite broadcasts, audio tapes, videos, interactive 
television, and CD-ROMs, etc. The scope of e-learning applications includes 
online learning, computerized learning, virtual classrooms, and digital coopera-
tion” (Chen and Chiu 2005). 
In general, educators and trainers use computers at all levels of education, 
business and training in different ways to enhance and support learning and 
teaching (Molnar 1997). Consequently, the term e-learning has different mean-
ings in different contexts. For example, in the school sector, e-learning refers to 
a combination of both online and software-based learning, whereas in the higher 
education and training sectors it refers to a variety of online practices. Also, it 
relates to Internet-based flexible delivery of content and programs that support 
particular communities of practice (Nicholson 2007). 
Over the past 30 years, technology-based learning systems have changed 
dramatically. In Table ‎3-1 below, Keengwe and Kidd (2010) give a summary of 
e-learning practice and change in education technology over the past 30 years 
and compare the characteristics of each period. From the beginning, e-learning 
has focused on computer-assisted learning, providing tools to solve problems for 
local users. Then it moved and began to concentrate on computer-based train-
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ing using older CAL models with interactive multimedia courseware. After the 
emergence of the Internet, the focus moved to web-based training delivering 
content through the internet. After that, the concept of e-learning becomes 
more focused and the term even more popular. We see the delivery of internet-
based flexible courseware, increased interactivity, online multimedia courseware 
and remote user-user interactions. Finally, and most recently, e-learning has 
moved to the stage of mobile learning and social networking. This period has 
more practical features, such as interactive distance courseware via a portable 
device such as a laptop. Moreover, when it comes to learning with portable 
technologies the focus is on the mobility of the learner (Keengwe and Kidd 
2010). 
Table ‎3-1: The changing focus of educational technology over the past 30 years 
(Keengwe and Kidd 2010). 
Ear Focus Educational characteristics 
1975-1985 
Programming; 
Drill and practice; 
Computer-assisted learn-
ing –  CAL 
Behaviourist approaches to learning 
and instruction 
Programming to build tools and solve 
problems 
Local user-computer interaction. 
1983-1990 
Computer-Based Training; 
Multimedia; 
Use of older CAL models with interac-
tive multimedia courseware 
Passive learner models dominant 
Constructivist influences begin to ap-
pear in educational software design and 
use. 
1990-1995 Web-based Training 
Internet-based content delivery  
Active learner models developed 
Constructivist perspectives common 
Limited end-user interactions. 
1995-2005 E-Learning 
Internet-based flexible courseware de-
liver; increased interactivity  
Online multimedia courseware Distrib-
uted constructivist and cognitivist 
models common  
Remote user-user interactions 
2005-present 
Mobile learning and social 
networking 
Interactive distance courseware Dis-
tributed online through learning man-
agement systems with social network-
ing components  
Learning that is facilitated via a wire-
less device such as a PDA, a 
smart phone or a laptop  
Learning with portable technologies 
where the focus is on the mobility of 
the learner 
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3.1.1 The Emergence of E-Learning 2.0 
The e-learning domain has been influenced by many factors. The nature of the 
web, new technologies and internet users have been considered to be the most 
important factors that captured the attention of numerous e-learning research-
ers. Internet users prefer concurrent information from video, images and text 
(multiple sources). Moreover, they demand access to these resources and create 
their community through continuous communication with friends. On the web 
and the Internet, the Read Web was transformed into the Read-Write Web 
(Web 2.0). The web therefore became a platform in which content is created, 
shared, repurposed, and passed over the Internet, allowing communication 
through images, video, and multimedia (Downes 2005). 
These factors led to the emergence of e-learning 2.0, which sees the benefits of 
traditional e-learning integrated with Web 2.0 services. Although Web 2.0 ser-
vices, such as blogs, wikis, and other social software, were not designed specifi-
cally for use in education, they help make e-learning far more personal, social, 
and flexible (MacManus 2007). Teachers are starting to investigate the poten-
tial of wikis, blogs, sharing services and other social software to create new 
learning opportunities (O'Hear 2006). 
3.2 Intelligent Systems for E-Learning 
When considering intelligent approaches for e-learning, there are two types: In-
telligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) and Adaptive Hypermedia (AH). These sys-
tems approaches behave intelligently when interacting with students and re-
sources. This section will explain them in more detail. 
3.2.1 Intelligent tutoring systems 
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) are an outgrowth of traditional systems 
known as computer-aided instruction. The goal of ITS is to engage students in 
sustained reasoning activity and to interact with the student based on a deep 
understanding of the student’s behaviour (Corbett, Koedinger et al. 1997). ITSs 
are computer-based learning systems providing methods of teaching and learn-
ing based on one-to-one interaction that enables learners to practice their skills 
by carrying out tasks within highly interactive learning environments. They as-
sess each learner's actions within these interactive environments and develop a 
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model of their knowledge, skills, and expertise (Phobun and Vicheanpanya 
2010). They are classified as intelligent, meaning they must present tutoring 
capabilities analogous to a human. Consequently, they are expected to be able 
not only to adjust the content but also to deliver it to students’ needs by ana-
lysing and anticipating their responses and behaviours (Nkambou 2006). 
Syed and McRoy have proposed that ITS system is composed of four 
components (Figure ‎3-1): the interface module, the expert module, the student 
module, and the tutor module (Syed and McRoy 2000). The interface module 
provides the method for the student to interact with the ITS through its graph-
ical user interface (GUI) and sometimes through a rich simulation of the task 
domain. The expert module references a domain model. This domain contains a 
description of the knowledge or behaviours that represent expertise in the sub-
ject-matter domain, i.e. the expert system or cognitive model that the ITS is 
teaching. The student module contains descriptions of the student’s knowledge 
or behaviours, including their misconceptions and knowledge gaps. The tutor 
module takes corrective action, such as providing feedback or remedial instruc-
tion. It needs information about what a human tutor in such situations would 
do (Urban-Lurain 1996). 
 
Figure ‎3-1: The components of an intelligent tutoring system(Phobun and 
Vicheanpanya 2010) 
ITSs provide practice-based instruction to support corporate training and 
higher education and enable participants to practise their skills by accomplish-
ing tasks in interactive environments. ITS systems assess each learner’s actions 
in these environments and develop a model according to his or her knowledge, 
skills and expertise (Corbett, Koedinger et al. 1997) (Ong and Ramachandran 
2003). Indeed, Ong and Ramachandrann (2003) said that students using ITS-
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based applications learn faster than in classroom-trained practice. At Carnegie 
Mellon University, for example, researchers developed an ITS called the LISP 
Tutor. This system taught computer programming skills to students. In that 
experiment, students who used the ITS scored 43% higher in the final exam 
than a control group that received traditional instruction (Ong and 
Ramachandran 2003). 
Both ITS and AH are intrinsically related to education. A number of 
technologies for AH were developed for adaptive educational hypermedia 
(AEH). In turn, ITS provided the origins of research on AEH. In early ITS re-
search, the systems provided little or no learning materials. It was thought that 
the only important job of ITS was to support students in solving the problem 
they faced. However, after the growth in computer capabilities, it was found 
that the combination of ITS and learning materials organised as hypermedia 
was a starting point for the research on AEH (Brusilovsky 2000). 
3.2.2 Adaptive hypermedia 
AH systems have become common in the last few years as tools for user-driven 
access to information. AH tries to tackle the fact that users are individuals and 
it provides them with appropriate solutions for their needs. According to a def-
inition provided by Brusilovsky (2001), adaptive hypermedia systems consider 
the goals, preferences and knowledge to build a model of the individual user 
and use this throughout the interaction with the user in order to adapt to the 
use’s needs (Brusilovsky 2001). It can be seen from this definition that AH sys-
tems can be useful in e-learning areas where students have different goals, 
where they can suggest the most relevant links or change the content as re-
quired (Brusilovsky, Eklund et al. 1998).  
The main issue with AH is adaptation. As we can see in Figure 3-2 
Brusilovsky described two methods of providing adaptation in AH (Brusilovsky 
1996). They are as follows: 
 Adaptive presentation is a technique for altering the content of 
the page to satisfy the needs of a particular user. For instance, a user 
with more knowledge about a certain area can be provided with de-
tailed information, while a beginner with little knowledge can be giv-
en general explanations. 
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 Adaptive navigation support adapts the way links are presented 
and displayed to the user to help them to find their paths to their 
goal. 
 
 
Figure ‎3-2: Taxonomy of Adaptive Hypermedia Technologies (Brusilovsky, 2001) 
The adaptability of AEH is provided by the learner model. Thus, the de-
sign of the student model (SM) mainly influences the system adaptation 
(Papanikolaou, Grigoriadou et al. 2003). In using an SM, optimal teaching ac-
tions for given students and supports are selected during the realisation of the 
action (Brusilovsky 1994). SM is mainly used in order to adapt the AH to each 
student, which requires creating an individual model for each student that 
shows the current knowledge of the student. This process adapts the learning 
material and helps the students when using the system. Gonzalez et al. (2006) 
remarked that, in general, the adaptation process can be described in three 
stages: getting the information about the student, processing the information to 
initialise and update an SM, and using the SM to provide the adaptation.  ehT 
SM can be useful in identifying student plans or solution paths, as well as for 
evaluating student performance (Gonzalez, Burguillo et al. 2006). 
3.2.3 Existing Adaptive E-Learning Systems 
This section details two adaptive e-learning systems that have been chosen to 
demonstrate how adaptivity can be applied in e-learning. 
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InterBook 
InterBook is a tool for authoring and delivering adaptive electronic textbooks 
on the web. It provides the user with two types of knowledge: the domain mod-
el and the SM. The domain model provides a structure for the representation of 
the student’s knowledge of the subject. For each domain model, InterBook 
stores the individual student’s knowledge model, indicating the level of the stu-
dent’s knowledge of this concept and specific type of SM, called an overlay 
model. The overlay model allows the system to measure the student’s 
knowledge of different topics. Thus, all student actions are tracked in order to 
set and update the knowledge levels required for that student (Brusilovsky, 
Eklund et al. 1998).  
In InterBook, domain knowledge is indexed using prerequisite information. 
This helps InterBook to insert different coloured icons next to each page to 
show their status to the student. Pages visited are marked with a white icon 
meaning ‘nothing-new’; pages with the pre-requisite condition met are labelled 
green, meaning ‘ready-to-be-learned’; and pages that fail the pre-requisite condi-
tion are labelled red, indicating ‘not-ready-to-be-learned’. This technique allows 
the student to visually measure a link’s condition (Bailey 2002).  
ActiveMATH 
 Melis et al. (Melis, Andrès et al. 2001) developed a generic, web-based, adap-
tive learning environment system called ActiveMATH. The ActiveMATH sys-
tem dynamically generates interactive documents and formulae according to the 
student’s content needs and presentation preferences. It was built for use in the 
field of mathematics and is realised as a client server web architecture that can 
be accessed using a standard web-browser. Instruction content and pedagogical 
knowledge can be filled in so as to provide a generic framework. ActiveMATH 
is configurable with pedagogical strategies and is therefore a tool for experimen-
tation in appropriate learning settings. 
ActiveMATH provides student with adaptive content selection and 
presentation, support of active learning, and adaptive appearance. It consists of 
the following components: a session manager, the knowledge base, a course gen-
erator, a user model, a pedagogical module, and deduction and computation 
service systems. The components can communicate by a standardised XML 
protocol. The course generator requests and processes information from the 
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knowledge base, from the user model, and from the pedagogical module, to gen-
erate a document adapted to the student’s goals, preferences, and knowledge. 
Information about the student’s actions is passed from the session manager to 
the student model, where it is used for updating (Melis, Andrès et al. 2001; 
Melis, Budenbender et al. 2002). 
3.3 Learning theory 
Learning theory underpins the understanding of how students learn in a 
social context and can extend to the learning organisation, which can improve 
its learning activities through collective reflection and sharing experiences 
(Holmes and Gardner 2006). There are many different schools of thought re-
garding learning theories but this section will focus on the most relevant and 
applicable to e-learning, including constructivism, behaviourism and cogni-
tivism. 
Constructivism is based on the belief that our personal world is construct-
ed in our minds and these personal constructions define our personal realities. 
Lefoe said that “there are diverse views on what the term constructivism means 
however they tend to share the tow a belief, (a) learning is an active process of 
constructing rather than acquiring knowledge and, (b) instruction is a process 
of supporting that construction rather than communicating knowledge” (Lefoe 
1998). Knowledge in constructivism is how the individual creates meaning from 
his or her experiences, not what is said is true. Thus, the individual is required 
to examine learning processes by collecting, recording, and analysing data, and 
to reflect on previous understandings to construct an individual meaning 
(Jonassen, Davidson et al. 1995). 
Behaviourism is connected to the idea that learning is largely unknowable; 
we cannot possibly understand what goes on inside a person and behaviourism 
states that only observable behaviours are worthy of research. It was first pio-
neered by Waston, who looked at how behaviour is affected by the process of 
learning. It focuses on behaviour and observes it, which is more important than 
understanding internal activities and takes into account simple elements such 
as specific stimuli and responses (Siemens 2005). 
Cognitivism focuses on the mental activities of the learner and sees the 
mind as valuable and necessary for understanding how people learn (Limberg 
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and Alexandersson 2010). Cognitivists consider the learning process in internal 
processes of information as involving thinking, motivation and memory. Cogni-
tive psychology postulates that information is stored in the long-term memory 
as a node relationship, and maps that to show major concept in a topic. Cogni-
tivism says that an existing knowledge structure must be present in order to 
compare and process new information for learning. Learning strategies should 
present the learning material and use the appropriate ways that enable the 
learner to process that material efficiently (Ally 2004) (McLeod 2003) 
3.4 Personalised Learning 
3.4.1 What is personalised learning? 
Personalisation is a very important issue that is seen in many different E do-
mains, such e-commerce, e-health and e-learning. In an educational setting, it is 
about working in partnership with the learner to tailor their learning experience 
and pathways according to their needs and personal objectives. Personalisation 
is perceived as the task of providing every learner with appropriate learning 
opportunities to meet individual learning needs supported by relevant resources 
that promote choice and advance learner autonomy (Bariso 2010). The concept 
of personalised learning emerged as a result of several developments. Partly, it 
is a reflection of living and working in a modern society, the development of 
new technologies and, in particular, how they can enable learners to break 
down institutional barriers and become a part of a global society.  
There is also a growing recognition that current educational provision 
may be too narrow and restrictive and is not meeting individual learners or so-
ciety’s needs (Conole 2010). Current learners see technology as core to their 
learning environments, in particular computers and mobile devices. They use 
the internet to support their learning, to find information and to discuss work 
with other students and teachers. They are comfortable working with multiple 
representations, are digitally literate, and happy to turn to internet-based tools 
to help achieve their learning (Bariso 2010). 
Sampson (Sampson 2001) has suggested that e-learning benefits from ad-
vanced information processing and internet technologies to provide the follow-
ing features which could be considered crucial to personalised learning: 
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 Personalisation, where learning material is customised to individual 
learners, based on an analysis of the learner’s objectives, status and 
learning preferences.  
 Interactivity, where learners can experience active and situated 
learning through simulations of real-world events and online collabo-
ration.  
 Media-rich content, i.e. educational materials presented in differ-
ent forms and styles. 
 Just-in-time delivery, i.e. support systems that can facilitate 
training delivery at the exact time and place that it is needed to 
complete a certain task.  
 User-centric environments, where learners take responsibility for 
their own learning. 
Mourlas and Germanakos stated that personalisation is usually applied by 
three different types of adaptation: content level adaptation, presentation level 
adaptation, and navigation level adaptation (Mourlas and Germanakos 2009). 
Content level adaptation means the generating of a lesson from various educa-
tional materials depending on the knowledge level of the learner. Thus, novice 
learners will be provided with more explanations, while the more advanced may 
receive more detailed and in depth information (Brusilovsky, Eklund et al. 
1998; Kosch, Döller et al. 2001; Cantador, Fernández et al. 2008). Presentation 
level adaptation is typically implemented by removing some information from a 
piece of text, inserting extra information or changing the layout of the page, 
instead of the text, such as font type and size and background colour (Specht 
2000; Albayrak, Wollny et al. 2005). Lastly, navigation-level adaptation in-
cludes direct guidance, hiding, sorting, disabling or removing links, and generat-
ing new links (Brusilovsky 2003; Millard, Davis et al. 2003). 
3.4.2 The need for personalised learning 
There are significant benefits to personalisation. Jarvela summarised the bene-
fits as follows (Järvelä 2006):   
 Increased student interest. Personalising learning can help to 
raise the learner’s level of interest in learning activities. As a result, 
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learning speed will be increased and learners will achieve better re-
sults and understanding.  
 Better learning strategies. Personalising learning can result in 
better learning outcomes by involve then in the development.  If stu-
dents learn with an aim at developing, they will learn who to learn 
new skills and involve social learning activities. This learning method 
can help to create learning communities with collaborative learning 
models.  
 Multiple ways to expand learning. Personalising learning can 
improve the use of technology in education. Technology is an intelli-
gent tool for providing individual learning, also supporting collabora-
tive learning among different individuals. This can lead to multiple 
ways to expand the learning potential of every student. 
3.4.3 Technologies and approaches  
ITS and AH and are technologies and approaches to solving personalised learn-
ing. In ITS, the interaction with the student is based on a deep understanding 
of the student’s behaviour. ITS systems assess each learner’s actions in his or 
her learning environment and develop a model according to his or her 
knowledge, skills and expertise (Corbett, Koedinger et al. 1997). AH systems 
similarly personalise the learning experience by modifying content and links ac-
cording to a user model. AH systems can be useful in e-learning areas where 
students have different goals (Brusilovsky, Eklund et al. 1998). However, these 
are typically centralised solutions and provide only limited autonomy to users.   
Based on this work we believe that agent technology is a good approach 
to support personalised and informal learning. This is because of the character-
istics of intelligent agents, principally their autonomy, social ability, adaptabil-
ity, and reaction skills. Because of these characteristics, agents are a powerful 
way of representing learners in a system, adapting content and acting autono-
mously on their behalf. In addition, they can interact with multiple students 
and agents at the same time in order to facilitate collaborative and team learn-
ing without the need for a formal centralised authority (Sampson, 
Karagiannidis et al. 2002). 
3.5 Personal Learning Environments  
 37 
Rapid technological development and the move away from single centralised 
architectures towards shared, distributed architectures (White and Davis 2011) 
have influenced learning and teaching methods and activities. Traditional learn-
ing systems support the management of learning content with a focus on tradi-
tional learning environments, in which control comes from the teacher. In con-
trast, personal learning environments (PLEs) are based on user control through 
software tools that connect people and facilitate collaboration and communica-
tion (Schaffert and Hilzensauer 2008). The emergence of the read-write web 
through the implementation of web 2.0 and the growth in social web applica-
tions are identified as the origin of PLEs (White and Davis 2011). The idea be-
hind this is that learning will take place in different contexts and situations and 
will no longer be provided by a single learning provider (Attwell 2007). Har-
melen (2006) defines a PLE as a single user’s e-learning system that provides 
access to a variety of learning resources, and that may provide access to learn-
ers and teachers who use other PLEs and/or VLEs (Harmelen 2006). 
PLEs have some advantages that support e-learning. Anderson identifies 
some advantages of PLEs, which are (Anderson 2006): 
 Identity: Learners have existences beyond formal school. This can 
be used to help learners to contextualise their own understanding and 
others to understand their epistemological legacy. 
 Persistence: The reflective posting of a blog is a digital record of 
the learning process. When combined, they can be an integral part of 
the lifelong learning accomplishment and e-portfolio of the learner. 
They should not disappear at the end of a course.  
 Ease of use: PLE environments can be customised and personalised, 
allowing education to flow into the learners’ other net applications. A 
PLE can be customised by both teachers and learners to set educa-
tional environments.  
 Control and responsibility of ownership: The PLE sets the con-
text of the learning, which is created and sustained by the learner 
and is not owned by the institution.  
 Social presence: The PLE supports online culture, allowing learners 
to project themselves socially and emotionally and to communicate 
with each other.  
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Although PLEs offer a new learning paradigm, there are some disad-
vantages. These are listed by Dron and Bhattacharya (Dron and Bhattacharya 
2007) as follows: 
 Technical problems: many technologies require computing capaci-
ty that not everyone has access to. 
 Technophobia: it is hard for older teachers and learners to use the 
available technologies. 
 Loss of monitoring and control: when using PLE, it may be diffi-
cult or impossible to police interaction between students. 
 Loss of history: it is difficult to keep track of all the records needed 
to evaluate and reflect on the success or failure of the efforts made. 
 Inequalities: there is a risk that those who use tools inefficiently are 
disadvantaged compared to those who use them more capably. 
3.5.1 From formal to informal learning 
There are many definitions of formal and informal learning, but the key distinc-
tion is that formal learning is typically described as learning that is managed in 
some manner by an authority (for example, a school or university), while in-
formal learning is less managed, or may be managed by the learner themselves 
(Coombs and Ahmed 1974; McGivney 1999). A survey by Cross showed that 
70% of adult learning is self-directed (Cross 1992) and informal learning is in-
creasingly recognised as a key domain for TEL. Informal learning includes all 
that is learned in daily life experience at home, work and leisure. It is all the 
learning that occurs away from the world of organised and structured learning 
(Conner 2008) (Mason and Rennie 2007). Formal learning is planned learning 
in a structured setting. However, according to Conner (2008), most learning 
does not take place in formal programmes but happens through activities not 
formally organised by any institute. Indeed, informal learning accounts for over 
75% of learning in modern organisations (Conner 2008). 
Informal learning can be supported by e-learning concepts and technology, 
constituting a social web. These factors alter informal learning and it requires 
little effort for individuals to keep in touch and to stay connected. For many, 
the social web is a place for networking, community building and sharing col-
lective experience (Mason and Rennie 2007). 
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3.6 Multiagent Systems in E-Learning 
In e-learning, multiagent systems appear to be a promising approach to deal 
with the challenges in educational environments. They can provide new pat-
terns of learning and applications, such as personal assistants, user guides and 
alternative help systems, which are helpful for both students and teachers in 
their computer-aided learning or teaching process (Aroyo and Kommers 1999). 
Using multiagent systems to design educational systems could lead to more ver-
satile, faster and lower cost systems and also  provides a dynamic adaptation of 
the behaviours of individual learners (Silveira and Vicari 2002) (Bednarik, Joy 
et al. 2005). 
3.6.1 Examples of E-Learning Multiagent Systems 
A number of researchers have applied agent technology to e-learning. Below are 
some different systems which are supported by agent technology and which use 
various approaches to facilitate e-learning. 
ABADAL 
Sun, Joy et al.  proposed an agent-based sytem that is adaptive, able to learn 
and dynamic (Sun, Joy et al. 2005). The system is implemented as a BDI-based 
agent which makes decisions according to its knowledge, and is able to reason 
about its actions. This system can achieve adaptivity by the use of learning 
style schemes through a set of agents that use prebuilt knowledge. This 
knowledge is used to determine the learning styles and learning objects that are 
appropriate for individual students.  
The system is functionally constructed by five agents, as shown in 
ure ‎3-3. Each agent is designed to satisfy a certain functional requirement that 
provides adaptive and dynamic learning materials. The agents are:  
 Student Agent: the agent which controls the communication with stu-
dents and provides information through the interface from the user to other 
agents in the system.  
Record Agent: the main data storage centre of the system; most of the 
data contained in the system is stored within this agent, which is also responsi-
ble for answering questions and feedback from the student agent and learning 
object agent.  
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Modelling Agent: this models individual students’ needs and their 
knowledge background, based on good data for the model from the information 
provided by the Record Agent and provides this modelling to the learning ob-
ject agent. 
Learning Object Agent: the agent responsible for managing the learn-
ing objects, which are organised beads on the learning style scheme. By com-
municating with the modelling agent, it can provide students with different 
learning styles with relevant learning objects.  
Evaluation Agent: the agent which presents the learning objects in an 
individual and adaptive learning path to each student. It uses the student data 
in the system to decide which learning objects will be sent to each student. 
 
Figure ‎3-3: The architecture (Sun, Joy et al. 2005)  
ILMDA 
Soh presented an intelligent agent prototype called ILMDA. It uses the history 
of learning to delivers to the learner a learning materials based on the student’s 
profile, interaction and the student dynamic activity profile (Soh 2006). These 
learning materials are composed of a tutorial and exercises to assess the stu-
dent’s understanding. The system chooses the appropriate examples and exer-
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cise based on how the student progresses through the learning materials and 
based on his or her profile. 
The system is built on the three-tier approach shown in Figure ‎3-4. 
ILMDA includes GUI, a database and reasoning in between. Through the GUI 
the student can interact with the system and access the learning materials. 
There is an agent capturing the student’s interactions with the GUI and using a 
reasoning module with a parametric profile of the student. This reasoning mod-
ule can help a search query to retrieve from the database most appropriate ex-
ample or problem and adapt to the student and delivers in real time to the user 
through the interface (Soh 2006). 
 
Figure ‎3-4: The ILMDA system and environment (Soh 2006) 
IDEAL 
Shang et al. presented an intelligent agent-assisted environment for active 
learning (Shang, Shi et al. 2001). This web-based multiagent learning system, 
known as IDEAL, has a three-tier architecture (Figure ‎3-5). The system pro-
vides a rich set of online contents, maximises the interactivity between the in-
telligent learning system and the students, and customises the learning process 
to the needs of individual students.  
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Figure ‎3-5: The IDEAL framework (Shang, Shi et al. 2001). 
The system supports personalised interaction between users and the learn-
ing systems, enables adaptive delivery of content, facilitates automatic evalua-
tion of learning outcomes, and provides easy-to-use authoring tools. 
In IDEAL, each student is assigned an agent managing learning styles and 
interests to generate a student profile. This agent will contact other agents in 
the system via communication channels to deliver the learning material to the 
student. The system has course agents managing course materials and tech-
niques for teaching connected with the course, also acting as mediators for 
communication among agents. Also, there are teaching agents that can talk to 
any course agent and select one nearby for better performance (Shang, Shi et 
al. 2001).  
The system uses active XML documents to deliver course materials. These 
materials consist of small components (lecturelets) around the subjects to be 
learned. Lecturelets contain XML documents and instructions explaining how 
the documents should be displayed. 
PVLE 
Xu and Wang developed a personalisation model, from which they proposed 
intelligent decision-making agents to achieve the personalisation in PVLEs by 
employing intelligent agents. Subsequently, they designed a multi-agent based 
PVLE architecture (Xu and Wang 2006) (Figure ‎3-6). It is based on the per-
sonalisation model and is designed in three layers; learner layer, agent layer and 
repository layer. The learner layer provides an adaptive interface for online 
learners. The agent layer contains a number of intelligent decision-making 
agents that support personalisation. These agents are designed based on the 
personalisation model and fitted into two learning process stages. This layer 
comprises three agents: 
Activity Agent: This agent records learning activities and learning du-
ration on a particular task and documents. All these activities are stored in the 
learner profile by the Activity Agent. 
Modelling Agent: abstracts the learner model, based on the learner pro-
file.  
Planning Agent: uses learner model based on the and the content model 
to analyses the current learning plan of the particular learner.  
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Figure ‎3-6: PVLE architecture (Xu and Wang 2006)  
3.7 Motivational Scenarios 
It is believed that agents have the potential to transform Technology Enhanced 
Learning (TEL) by enabling scenarios that are simply not feasible with today’s 
technology. This is possible because of some of the key features of agent sys-
tems, such as distributed control and agent autonomy. In this section, we illus-
trate this potential through three different TEL scenarios that show how agent 
technologies could be used in e-learning to take full advantage of the agent’s 
ability to communicate and negotiate. Each case is composed of a description of 
the scenario, an analysis of the agent solutions that make the scenarios possible, 
and more speculative variations of the scenario that would share the same fea-
tures. 
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Although the system explained in previous section applied agents in e-
learning, none of these systems apply any fundamental agent theories (such as 
mechanism design or social choice theory) to guide their design choices. They 
treat agent systems as component architectures, without really taking ad-
vantage of the distribution or autonomy of agents. 
Through the scenarios, we hope to show how certain types of problem in 
e-learning fit with known agent solutions (voting systems, coalition formation, 
and auction systems). We also hope to show how agent systems enable a very 
high level of personalisation and to start a discussion about the implications for 
education in the future. 
3.7.1 Scenario One: Course Selection 
Description: This scenario concerns a university that wants to support 
students who are interested in a wider variety of courses than it is possible for 
the university to offer. They must be chosen from among alternatives that are 
related to particular expected outcomes (Babad and Tayeb 2003). The universi-
ty must therefore somehow choose which subset of courses to run. This is a 
common scenario with Higher Education degree courses, where often students 
are offered a number of courses and for economic reasons only the most popular 
courses are run. However, current solutions are centralised, requiring students 
to hand over their preferences to a central algorithm controlled by the universi-
ty. In addition students are unable to respond to cancelled courses by changing 
their preferences. From a personalised learning point of view this is undesirable, 
as despite the tension between the goals of the institution and the students (the 
institution really wants to run as few courses as possible whereas each student 
wants to get the courses in which he or she has most interest), the student 
must hand over almost all control to an opaque process managed by the univer-
sity (Brown, Varley et al. 2009). 
Agent Solutions: In agent systems this scenario can be characterised as 
a voting problem. It occurs whenever agents are required to invest in or vote 
for a limited number of options within a greater number of more or less attrac-
tive possibilities. There are numerous potential solutions to voting problems 
where the outcome impacts all the agents (sometimes described as problems of 
social choice) but through transparent protocols they offer fairness, decentrali-
sation and independence, as they allow agents to choose their own voting strat-
egies. This distribution of control fits well with personalised learning. 
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Variations: This scenario describes students making choices about cours-
es within a single institution, but because agent solutions are decentralised an 
agent solution could also work in situations where students were choosing 
courses from multiple institutions (for example, as part of a personalised degree 
programme across Bologna compliant universities). Bologna is a European 
higher education process that focuses on cooperation between universities for 
academic exchange purposes. It aims at enhancing the mobility of students and 
higher education staff within the European Higher Education Area and at es-
tablishing a high-quality advanced knowledge base. A further aim is to make it 
more attractive for people from non-European countries to study in Europe 
(Bologna-Secretariat 2010). In a case using the Bologna process in a personal-
ised degree programme, the factors taken into account in an individual agent’s 
voting strategy might include issues such as institutional reputation, distance 
from home and student facilities. 
3.7.2 Scenario Two: Group Formation 
Description: Collaborative learning is an effective means of learning. The 
students benefit from sharing each other’s perspectives and learn from each 
other in addition to learning from the instructor. Students can get help from 
more advanced students in their group when they struggle, and also the better 
students can learn by teaching the students who are struggling (Redmond 
2001). In addition, it is practical for students to arrange themselves into groups 
for learning, for example to share equipment, to help with timetabling, or for 
pedagogical activities such as discussion. Students can group themselves or be 
grouped by a teacher either randomly or based on some criteria. Group for-
mation is important because although all students need to be allocated to a 
group, the mix of students might be important. For instance, it may be desira-
ble to have a mix of abilities, so that no one group has an advantage over an-
other in assessment (Christodoulopoulos and Papanikolaou 2007). 
Current solutions are normally centralised, meaning that students cannot 
have different criteria for group selection (for example, some students might 
wish to be in the most effective groups, while others would rather learn with 
existing friends) similarly to Scenario One this one-size-fits-all approach is at 
odds with personalised learning and the requirement to consider the learner’s 
experience (Ounnas, Davis et al. 2007) .  
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An interesting aspect of this scenario is that sometimes the goals of the 
teachers are at odds with the goals of the students. The students may wish to 
be placed in groups with their friends or with students that will help them to 
achieve good marks, while the teacher may want to arrange students in groups 
that will help them to learn more material or to learn it more quickly. This 
means that even non-centralised solutions may need to be mediated by a cen-
tral authority. 
Agent Solutions: In agent systems, an appropriate metaphor for this 
scenario is coalition formation a process by which agents form, join and switch 
groups until a stable set of coalitions is made. There are numerous potential 
protocols for this, for example by having an initial allocation, perhaps based on 
criteria set by the teacher, and then for the students to negotiate exchanging 
their places with students in other groups. The agent framework provides the 
conversational mechanism for this negotiation, but the agents need some self-
organisation. For example, each coalition might produce a virtual leader agent 
to negotiate with the leaders of the other groups. At the same time, each leader 
agent has to negotiate with the teacher agent because any changes made in 
group membership still have to conform to the constraints set by the teacher 
agent. 
Variations: This scenario envisages group formation occurring under the 
supervision of a teacher or lecturer, and therefore implies a more formal educa-
tional context. However, distributed group formation enabled by agents could 
enable informal learners to also benefit from group work, by helping them form 
coalitions with other (potentially remote) learners who share similar pedagogi-
cal goals. Such distributed agent-based group formation systems could be of 
great help to life-long learners, and could form the basis of informal group work 
and peer assessment without the need for a mediating teacher or institution. 
3.7.3 Scenario Three: Personalised Learning 
Description: Different students may have different personal preferences 
about the way they want to learn or to be assessed (Karagiannidis and 
Sampson 2002). These preferences may be because of preferred learning styles 
but could also be for other practical reasons (such as time commitments in 
their personal lives or different project requirements). An institution has diffi-
culty catering for these preferences, due to the mixed cost of providing different 
activities (for example, lectures are cheaper than tutorials) and resource re-
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strictions (such as time commitments of staff or access to specialised equipment 
or information sources) and their own guidelines and regulations about having a 
mixed set of assessment styles (for example, many universities are cautious 
about having courses assessed totally by coursework).  
It is therefore rare for an institution to allow much flexibility at an indi-
vidual level. Although there are limited solutions that allow a cohort to make 
choices about how they will be taught or assessed, these tend to be managed 
directly by teachers and are therefore of limited complexity (for example, it 
might be possible for the students to negotiate with their teacher about the 
methods of learning or assessment that will be used).   
Agent Solutions: In this kind of scenario, there are a number of limited 
resources (tutorial slots, lab equipment, seminar places, etc.) and many indi-
viduals competing for them. In agent systems this situation is characterised as 
an auction. The institution associates a cost with each type of activity and 
wants to minimise the total cost or at least prevent it from rising above an 
agreed level. This cost need not be purely financial; it could include factors 
such as value to external assessors or complexity for staff to manage.  
There are many different kinds of auction and therefore different solutions 
to this problem. But as an example we can define a utility function for each 
agent that calculates a student’s satisfaction with the activities they have been 
allocated. Following an initial allocation, agents could then bargain (negotiate) 
with their institution, exchanging items according to their cost until their utili-
ty function is maximised within the constraints of the institution’s cost level.  
Variations: Using an economic model allows a university to adjust the 
wealth (and therefore purchasing power) of certain students according to cir-
cumstances. For example, students with learning difficulties such as dyslexia 
could be given more credit, allowing them to tailor their learning experience 
within the same economic framework as other students. More controversially, 
students might actually be allowed to purchase additional credit, in effect buy-
ing themselves more expensive tuition through the university fees system. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter started with a brief description of e-learning and its systems with 
a focus on different approaches, such as ITS and AH. It went on to describe 
how technology can assist education by providing flexible services applications 
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and ways to learn. A number of different scenarios in e-learning where agent 
technology might be useful were then presented. 
It also presented different existing systems which are supported by agent 
technology. Although existing system apply agents to e-learning, none of them 
applies any fundamental agent theories, such as mechanism design or social 
choice theory, to guide their design choices. In contrast, the approach presented 
in this thesis is to explore how agent systems can be used for decentralization 
as well as personalization. In our experiment we examine how voting mecha-
nisms can be used in an e-learning scenario where a University agent represents 
all the courses available, and where student agents can vote in any way he or 
she prefers. Thus work will be explained in details in the following chapters. 
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  Chapter 4.
Experimental System Design 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we discussed agent technology focusing on its definition 
and the related topics that enable multiagent systems to make collective deci-
sions such as social choice theory and voting protocols. We also discussed relat-
ed work in technology and education.  This focused on personalised and infor-
mal learning, the existing use of agent technology, and how these technologies 
change the way that students use it when learning.  
Laying out the foundation of the thesis work, this chapter describes the 
multiagent system simulation that has been used to investigate how agent sys-
tems can form a good framework for distributed e-learning systems. It also con-
siders how they can be applied in personal learning contexts where students are 
autonomous and independent. 
 To investigate the research hypotheses which are in section 1.2, we ran 
three main experiments as follow: 
Experiment One: Agent Simulation for Decentralised E-learning Scenario 
(Chapter 5). 
Experiment Two: Agent Simulation for E-Learning System Involving 
Complex Preferences (Chapter 6). 
Experiment Three: Fairness in Intelligent E-Learning Systems Using 
Agent Simulation (Chapter 7). 
This chapter will explain the agent environment designed to run these ex-
perimental simulations. It describes the architecture of the system and the pro-
tocol and voting procedure that the agents follow.  It also sets out how student 
preferences are modelled and describes three different voting strategies that 
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have been implemented. The changes required for implementing each simula-
tion will be described in its chapter. 
4.1 Course selection scenario 
In section 3.6 we consider three different e-learning scenarios showing how 
agent technologies could be used in e-learning to take full advantage of the 
agent’s ability to communicate and negotiate. In this research, the course selec-
tion scenario was chosen as the basis for carrying out the investigation. This 
scenario concerns a higher education institution which offers a set number of 
courses. Students are required to register for these courses but the institution 
may choose not to run a course if there is insufficient interest. This scenario 
was chosen because it is both simple and sensible and it provides a straightfor-
ward way of evaluating agent satisfaction. In this scenario there is one agent 
that represents the university which is in charge of resources and many agents 
that represent students. However, despite its simplicity, this scenario still fea-
tures autonomy and negotiation and reflects the potential of using voting based 
agent technology in e-learning.  
In more details, many educational organisations there exist restrictions on 
which courses might run, due to the overheads of running each course.  In the 
context of personalised learning, where students take more control of their 
learning, the university would like students collectively to make the decision 
about which courses are run, while taking into account any individual prefer-
ences. The intention is that by using a voting protocol, students can express 
their preferences over the courses available and choose their own strategies for 
deciding collectively which courses to run. Multiagent systems are a powerful 
technology to tackle this complexity and to enable flexible course selection sys-
tems through enabling features such as autonomy, responsibility, social ability 
and intelligence (Jennings and Wooldridge 1998; Wang, Sun et al. 2005). 
We considered three different cases. The reason for this is to ensure that 
the system works well and that the data is representative. These cases differ in 
terms of the number of students, the number of total courses and the number 
of running courses. Table ‎4-1 shows the settings for these cases. The cases have 
been chosen to reflect the kind of courses typical in UK university departments.  
The column # courses (m) shows how many courses there are for each case. 
We consider three modules: Case 1 represents a large undergraduate course 
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with 100 students, which is a typical bachelor course; Case 2 represents a me-
dium-sized undergraduate university course with 60 students, which can be 
considered a typical third-year course; and Case 3, which is a postgraduate uni-
versity course with 20 MSc students. The column #running courses (r) shows 
the number of courses that will eventually run. The column #student (n) shows 
the number of students in the experiments.  
Table ‎4-1: Different settings for the cases 
case #courses (m) #running courses (r) #student (n) 
1 51 10 20 30 40 100 
2 33 11 18 26 60 
3 18 4 9 14 20 
 
There are many factors that influence the behaviour of the agents. In or-
der to evaluate the strategies, the following variables were identified: 
  Number of courses (m): This is the total number of courses that the 
university provides and which the student can vote for.  
  Number of running courses (r): This is the remaining total number 
of courses, after the ones with the lowest student interest have been cancelled.  
  Number of students (n): This is the total number of students in the 
system. 
In addition to the above variables, we also have a number of constants: 
Initial points (IP): This is the number of points that each student ini-
tially receives. Without loss of generality, we set this value to 100 in the exper-
iments.  
 : This is used when calculating the probability of a course being can-
celled for the intelligent strategy. This will be explained when talking about the 
systems strategies (see Section 4.5). Throughout our experiments, we set this 
value to five since it was shown in initial tests to perform well. 
Fraction of point to invest    : The maximum number of points that 
would be spent in the current round. 
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4.2 Architecture 
This section describes the architecture of the agent environment that was de-
signed to investigate the potential of using multiagent systems to support the 
personalised e-learning systems. The reason for using agent to vote is because 
there will be multiple rounds of voting where it would be very difficult for a 
student to participate every time when course is cancelled to the voting system 
to vote. Moreover, through these rounds, an agent can learn from the infor-
mation provided and predict what could happen to make a decision.  
All entities and objects that exist in the environment are shown in 
ure ‎4-1. This architecture consists of the two essential components: student 
agents (SAs) and university agent (UA).  
The student agent has two functions: one is to enable students to express-
es their preferences to the student agent and it also chooses an appropriate vot-
ing strategy. The second is to interact with the university agent based on these 
settings. The university agent manages the votes that are cast by the student 
agents and decides, based on the voting protocol (see section 4.3) and the votes 
received, which courses will be cancelled. Furthermore, after completing the en-
tire process, the university agent will provide the student agent with a final list 
of running courses. More detail about how the components interact is explained 
in the following section. 
The agents in this architecture are autonomous in that they have control 
over their own votes and can decide how to spend them without the interven-
tion of other agents. They also can perceive the environment around them and 
respond to any changes occurring. They are also able to take appropriate initia-
tives rather than only taking action in response to the environment. This in-
cludes an intelligent strategy wherein they expect a course to be cancelled and 
thus vote on other. 
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Figure ‎4-1: System architecture 
Because we are intending to test this in a simulation that will run 10,000 
times, we need a very fast execution time. For this reason it is an appropriate 
to use an agent framework such as Jade because of the communication over-
heads. We implemented the agent using a normal object-oriented JAVA pro-
gram, where agent communication is achieved through local method calls. This 
makes simulation faster and enables the cases to run thousands of times, 
though it would not be appropriate for a deployed agent environment. If this 
applied with a real student, it would be straightforward to translate to a dis-
tributed solution. 
4.3 Voting Protocol  
In general, a protocol is the set of rules that controls the interactions between 
agents and determines the beginning and end conditions of a given conversation 
(Beer, Inverno et al. 1998). Voting  procedures  describe  the  way and the roles 
by  which  the  preferences  of  individuals  are aggregated  to  produce  a  col-
lective  decision (Brams and Fishburn 2002). In this work, we introduce a novel 
voting protocol which combined features from both single transferable vote 
(STV) and cumulative voting (see section 2.4.1). Specifically, it takes ad-
vantage of the features of cumulative voting to express preferences using points.  
At the same time, it allows for multiple rounds to avoid wastage by allowing 
the transfer of points in a similar way to the transfer of votes in STV. Having 
multiple rounds also allows a student to learn from previous rounds and to ad-
just its voting behaviour accordingly.  
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In more details, the protocol works in several stages. In each stage, the 
student agents cast their votes over the courses by allocating points to them, 
taking into account their preferences. The course that receives the lowest num-
ber of cumulative points is cancelled and the points that were allocated to the 
cancelled course are refunded. In the next round, the student agents can use 
these points (and any points that they did not use in the previous rounds) to 
vote again. Furthermore, in each round, the students are informed about the 
total number of points that have been allocated to the remaining courses so far. 
Note that, once allocated, students cannot retrieve their points, unless the 
course is cancelled. The advantage of this iterative approach is that votes are 
not wasted since points allocated to the cancelled course can be reused for the 
remaining courses. Another very important thing to note is that students can 
use the information about the current “popularity” (i.e. the current cumulative 
points) of the courses to guide their voting behaviour (we discuss this in more 
detail in Section 4.5 where we discuss the voting strategies of students). The 
protocol proceeds as follows (see Figure ‎4-2) 
1. Each student initially receives an equal and fixed number of points, IP, 
from the university agent that they can use to cast their votes. 
2. Each student has their own preference over the courses and can allocate 
some or all of their available points to the available courses based on 
their preference (they do not have to allocate all their points, but can-
not allocate more than they have). 
3. After receiving votes from all students, the university agent calculates 
the cumulative points for each course.  
4. The university agent cancels the course with the lowest cumulative 
points. 
5. The university agent refunds the points for the cancelled course to any 
students who voted for it. 
6. The university agent informs all the student agents about the cancelled 
course and the current cumulative points allocated to the remaining 
courses.  
7. Now student agents can vote again using their remaining points (this 
includes the refunded points as well as any points which were not allo-
cated in the previous rounds) and the process is repeated until the de-
sired number of courses is remaining.  
 55 
 
 
Figure ‎4-2: the voting protocol 
For example, if there are 40 courses available in total, but the university 
only has sufficient resources (e.g. staff and lecture rooms) to run 30 courses, 
then the voting will proceed for ten iterations or rounds. At the end of each of 
these rounds, the course with the least number of cumulative points is can-
celled. 
4.4 Simple Preferences 
A simple student preference is used in the first simulation that investigates 
agent technology for the decentralised e-learning scenario (see Chapter 5). Here, 
a student's preference for a certain combination of courses is simply the sum of 
the preferences for each individual course. 
 Students are asked to proclaim their preferences over a set of courses.  
Each student has their own preference for the different courses that the univer-
sity offers. These preferences are modelled using a simple scoring model that 
describes a student's preference for each course as a number between 0 and 10, 
receives equal 
number of points
allocates points to 
the courses 
casts votes
calculate the 
cumulative votes 
cancels the course 
with the lowest sum 
points 
reaches 
desired number of 
courses
refunds the points +  
remaining courses 
with cumulative 
points 
sends final list 
of running 
courses
YES
end
Student agent University agent
NO
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where 0 means that the student has no interest in the course and 10 means 
maximum interest. 
 After the voting process has completed, we can use these preferences to 
calculate a given student’s satisfaction for the running courses. This is calculat-
ed by summing the preferences for courses that are running, as a fraction of the 
total preferences. For example, there are 7 courses available in total, and the 
preferences of a student are as follows:                         
           , where    is the preference for the i
th course. The university de-
cides, based on the voting process, only to run courses 2, 4 and 6. The student 
satisfaction is then calculated as follows: the sum of the preferences for the 
running course (21) is divided by the sum of the preferences for all courses (36). 
So the student satisfaction, S, is:  
  
  
  
            
Figure ‎4-3 illustrates the process as follows: 
 
Figure ‎4-3: Calculating student’s satisfaction with simple 
4.5 Voting Strategies 
Abstractly, a strategy determines the agent’s plan of action to achieve a partic-
ular goal. It specifies the way in which an agent behaves in a given environ-
ment (Wooldridge 2009). In our scenario, the strategy determines the number 
of points to allocate to the courses in each voting round, given the preferences 
of the agent and the information received by the UA about the outcomes of the 
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previous voting round (i.e. the points allocated so far, and the course can-
celled). In this section we introduce three different strategies for the SAs to al-
locate the points that are used across all of the experimental simulations, name-
ly: proportional, equal share and intelligent so that we can see different level of 
intelligence and also to explore the effect that different proportion of agents 
taking different strategies has on the outcome. In what follows we describe each 
of these strategies in detail.  
Proportional: The proportional strategy is included as an example of a 
simple but sensible strategy. Consequently, it provides a good benchmark that 
we can use to compare the performance of more sophisticated strategies. This 
strategy is simple in that it does not consider the information received by the 
UA about the current number of points allocated to the courses. The main idea 
behind a proportional strategy is that, in each round of voting, the student 
agent distributes its points proportionally to the student’s preferences for each 
course.  
In more detail, the number of points allocated to course j is calculated as 
follows. Let RP denote the total number of points remaining (in the first round 
IP=RP), m is the total number of courses available, and the vector   ⃗⃗  ⃗  
{            } denotes the student preferences. Then, the total number of 
points to be allocated to course j,    is: 
   
  
∑   
 
   
     
Equal-share: The equal share strategy is included as an example of a 
very simple and ineffective strategy which provides a good lower bound on the 
performance of the system. An equal share strategy is based on the principle 
that the SA gives all courses an equal number of votes, regardless of the stu-
dent’s preference. The following formula was used to calculate voting points 
each course: 
   
  
 
 
Intelligent: The intelligent strategy is considered an advanced measure 
of what can be achieved. It is included as an example of what can be achieved 
with a more sophisticated strategy that learns as the voting procedure progress-
es from one round to the next. Its effectiveness can be gauged by comparing it 
to the proportional strategy and the lower bound given by the equal share 
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strategy. The main idea behind this strategy is that, in each round, the SA tries 
to predict the probability that a course will be cancelled based on the number 
of points currently allocated to each course from previous rounds. (this infor-
mation is provided to all the SAs by the UA at the end of each round). When 
allocating points, this strategy does not spend all the points in the first round, 
in order to take advantage of the information that is received in subsequent 
rounds. Otherwise, it would have no more points to use in these rounds (unless 
a course for which votes were cast is cancelled, in which case the points are re-
turned). In the last voting round, it allocates all remaining points. Further-
more, in the first round, because the strategy does not have any information 
about courses, it distributes half of the points using the proportional strategy as 
explained above. 
In more details, the intelligent strategy consists of three parts. First, it 
tries to estimate the probabilities of a course being cancelled. Then, given these 
probabilities, it tries to estimate the expected utility (we use utility here in-
stead of satisfaction) for a given distribution of points. Finally, it uses a search 
algorithm to find the point distribution which maximises expected satisfaction. 
In what follows, we discuss these components in turn. 
Then, based on this probability for which a course will be cancelled, it can 
calculate its expected satisfaction for a given allocation of points, and it will 
allocate the points such that the expected satisfaction is maximised. The prob-
ability of a course being cancelled is estimated using a softmax function, which 
is commonly used in discrete choice theory to make decisions in the case of in-
complete information (Hensher, Rose et al. 2005). The probability that a course 
i is going to be cancelled in the future is given as: 
            ⃗   
 
         
∑         
 
   
  
 
∑  
         
∑         
 
   
  
     
 
Where     is the cumulative number of points which have so far been allo-
cated to course i, and    is the number of points that the student agent is plan-
ning to allocate to course i  in the current voting round and  ⃗  is the vector of 
points to be allocated. Furthermore,   is constant which enables a range of dif-
ferent strategies. For example, if    , then each course is equally likely to be 
cancelled, irrespective of the cumulative number of points currently allocated. 
At the other extreme, as    , the course with the lowest total number of 
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points will be cancelled with probability 1 and all other courses will be can-
celled with probability 0. All other cases fall somewhere in between. In our ex-
periments we tune the parameter   such that it performs well in practice. Also 
we set the parentage of points    representing the maximum number of points 
that would be spent in the current round as a fraction of total point. 
    We now show how we can use this probability to calculate the ex-
pected satisfaction, ES, of the student, and how to find the allocation which 
maximises this expected utility. The expected satisfaction is given as: 
    ⃗    ∑                ⃗      
 
   
  
Note that the expected utility depends on  ⃗⃗  , i.e. the number of points SA 
is going to allocate to each course in the next round. The next step is then to 
find the allocation that maximises this expected utility. We estimate this using 
a search algorithm based on random sampling, which proceeds as follows:  
1. We randomly generate an allocation vector   ⃗⃗⃗   subject to the constraint 
that the total number of points is equal to      the maximum number 
of points that we would like to spend in the current round.  
2. The student agent calculates the expected satisfaction.    
3. If the current solution has a higher expected satisfaction than any pre-
vious solution, then keep the solution. Otherwise, discard it.  
4. This process is repeated 1,000 times and the solution with the highest 
expected utility is kept. 
Finally, the SA provides the UA with the point allocation obtained from 
the above algorithm and preceding rounds until reaching the list contain the 
running course. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the multiagent system that has been used to investigate 
how agent systems can form a good framework for distributed e-learning sys-
tems. It began by explaining the agent environment, then describing the archi-
tecture of the system and the protocol and voting procedure the agents follow.  
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It also described how student preferences are modelled. It then presented three 
different voting strategies. 
In the coming chapters, we will cover the remaining contributions of this 
thesis by using the multiagent system simulation described in this chapter and 
conducting various experiments to test the hypotheses of this thesis.  
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  Chapter 5.
Agent Simulation for Decen-
tralised E-learning Scenario 
Having discussed in previous chapters the foundation of the thesis by signpost-
ing the concepts and technologies that can be utilised to build a decentralised 
agent-based e-learning system, this chapter and the following ones will cover 
the contributions of this thesis by discussing the various experiments conducted 
to justify the hypotheses.   
The main objective of this chapter is to use the multiagent system envi-
ronment described in chapter 4 to investigate whether voting procedures in par-
ticular and multiagent technology in general could potentially replace a central-
ised infrastructure. We will also explore the impact of agents using different 
strategies on overall student satisfaction, which is done by testing H1: 
In e-learning scenarios such as academic course selection, a decen-
tralised agent system using a voting protocol can achieve a compa-
rable level of overall student satisfaction to an optimal centralised 
approach, while maintaining levels of privacy and choice. 
In order to see the potential for an agent system replacing the centralised 
approach, we ran an experiment in two parts. In the first part called the Iden-
tical Voting Strategy, we ran a number of simulations across the three cases 
but with all the students using the same voting strategy. We then compare the 
results to optimal social welfare i.e. the social welfare when the overall most 
preferred courses are selected assuming that the university knows all the stu-
dent preferences and selects the courses which maximise the social welfare 
In the second part called Combination of Voting Strategies, we repeated 
those simulations but this time the student could take a mixture of strategies. 
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We compare a case in which a proportion of the students use one strategy and 
the remainder of the students use another strategy.  
The main questions this experiment tries to answer are: 
Q1: Can voting procedures in particular and multiagent technology in 
general potentially replace a centralised infrastructure? This is answered by 
Part 1. 
Q2: What is the impact of the three strategies described in the previous 
chapter on overall student satisfaction in terms of personalisation? This is an-
swered by Part 2. 
This chapter starts by explaining in detail how to conduct these two parts 
of the experiment, including methodology, analyses and results. A discussion 
and concluding remarks end the chapter. 
5.1  (PART 1) Identical Voting Strategies:  
This experiment has the aim of demonstrating decentralisation. It measures the 
performance of each strategy separately by allocating all students to a single 
strategy and then compares the outcome with the optimal solution. Here, “op-
timal solution” means that the central authority (i.e. the university) knows all 
the student preferences and selects the courses that maximise social welfare.  
5.1.1 Methodology 
In order to evaluate the experiment and analyse the outcome, the student pref-
erences need first to be set up in a way that matches the objective of the exper-
iment. Consequently, the experiment starts with the setting of the student 
agent preferences. In section 4.4, we explained in detail how to model the stu-
dent preferences in general. In this section, however, we explain how generate 
these preferences to run the experiments.  
To this end we use an approach that randomly initialise the preferences is 
through settings. Every student agent has individual preferences. For each stu-
dent agent and each course, we generate preferences from a uniform distribu-
tion between 0 and 10. These preferences were randomly generated so it was 
unlikely that any two agents have the same preferences.  
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Having the student agent preferences in place, we considered the three dif-
ferent cases mentioned in section 4.1 to reflect the reality of different types of 
courses in traditional UK universities. A number of different cases were selected 
to ensure that it is not just the setup of a particular set of variables that enable 
the experiment to work and to show that the system works in general and not 
only for a specific case.  
Here, a case means a situation where there are fixed number of courses 
and number of students while the number of running course is changeable. Be-
cause the aim of this experiment is to compare a single strategy with the opti-
mal, all students take a single strategy. This means that there is one simulation 
for each value of running courses in each case (a total of ten simulations). Each 
simulation runs 50 times with different student preferences and the results 
shown are the average results over these runs. Figure ‎5-1 shows the simplified 
sequence for conducting the experiment with different settings.  
 
 
Figure ‎5-1: Sequence for conducting a case with different settings 
In order to run the experiment, initial points (IP) is set to 100. The frac-
tion of point to invest      variable set to 50% of the total point. We set   val-
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ue to 5 since it was shown in initial tests to perform well. This explained when 
talking about the systems strategies (see Section 4.5). 
5.1.2 Result and Analysis 
We now proceed to discussing the results. Figure ‎5-2,Figure ‎5-3 and Figure ‎5-4 
show the results for cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Here, the y-axis shows the 
percentage of student satisfaction. This is calculated by the total satisfaction of 
the running courses, as a percentage of the total satisfaction if all the courses 
were running. Furthermore, on the x-axis we vary the total number of running 
courses while keeping the other parameters in the cases fixed. The graphs show 
the differences in the satisfaction of the agents using different strategies (when 
all agents use the strategy) and also comparing this with the satisfaction level 
seen in the optimal solution. These graphs do not include error bars because the 
confidence interval s is very small, making it difficult to put the error bars on 
them. 
These results show that the outcome of the proportional strategy is almost 
identical to the optimal strategy although there is a small difference, t is not 
statistically significant. The intelligent strategy does slightly less well but is still 
very close to optimal.  
Table ‎5-1and Table ‎5-2 display a statistical data to test whether there is a 
statistically significant difference in mean between intelligent and proportional 
strategies and the optimal.  Statistically, at 95% level of confidence  we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in  mean between both in-
telligent strategy and also the mean of proportional strategy  and  optimal be-
cause p value   0.05, and also according to the t-test , it is less than the 1.98 
for both of them. We consider case 1 with 20 running courses.  Others are the 
same so to avoid repetition they are put in appendix A). 
On the other hand, we see that the equal share strategy does worse be-
cause it distributes points among the courses equally regardless of the student 
preferences. Statistically, according to data in Table ‎5-3 we reject the null hy-
pothesis, which there is no difference in mean between equal-share strategy and 
optimal because p value   0.05, and we accept alternative hypothesis that 
there is a significant difference at 95% level of confidence. 
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This suggests that a decentralised solution using voting results in high-
quality solutions that are close to optimal as long as the student agents take a 
sensible strategy. Linking this to the first question, it could be said that a vot-
ing-based agent system can replace the centralised authority by providing an 
outcome that is close to the optimal strategy. 
 
Figure ‎5-2: Comparison the three single strategies to the optimal solution for case 1 
 
Table ‎5-1: Statistical values of comparison between intelligent strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 44.582 0.263 0.067 
Intelligent 44.489 0.260 0.068 
t = 1.778 df =98 p =0784 
Table ‎5-2: Statistical values of comparison between proportional strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 44.582 0.263 0.069 
Proportional 44.574 0.0.264 0.070 
t = 0.152         df = 98           p = 0.879 
Table ‎5-3: Statistical values of comparison between equal-share strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 44.582 0.263 0.069 
Equal-share 38.054 0.0.86 0.149 
     t = 98.826        df = 98          p =               
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Figure ‎5-3: Comparison the three single strategies to the optimal solution for case 2 
 
Figure ‎5-4: Comparison the three single strategies to the optimal solution for case 3 
Interestingly, in this setting the intelligent strategy performs slightly 
worse than the simpler proportional strategy. This can be expected because 
proportional strategy is similar to voting for “true” preferences, i.e. it does not 
try to outsmart the system. However, it may be possible for a group of students 
to outsmart the simple proportional strategy and increase their satisfaction at 
the expense of those students using the proportional strategy. To analyse this 
situation and also to investigate the performance of a different strategies that 
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student agent can use to allocate point to courses, in the next section we con-
sider a setting where students use different strategies. 
5.2 (PART 2) Combination of Voting Strategies:  
In this set of experiments a situation was compared where a number of student 
agents use one strategy and the remainder use another strategy. The aim here 
was inferred from the previous experiment, which is to explore how a student 
agent taking a different strategy would perform and what the impact on the 
outcome is where different strategies run together.    
5.2.1 Methodology 
In this set of experiments, we consider a case where a group of students are al-
located to one strategy, while the rest are allocated to another strategy. For 
example, if the total number is 60 student agents, 40 student agents could use 
the proportional strategy and the remaining 20 use the intelligent strategy. 
This combination of strategies can reflect the potential of voting approach 
when integrated with autonomous agent, it allows different student agent to 
use different strategy. It also allows them to express their preferences and vote 
for courses to reach a decision that satisfies their goals.  
In order to conduct this experiment, the setting of student agent prefer-
ences should be considered first. From the individual preferences explained in 
the previous experiment, we found that, when the student population is large 
and when the preferences are initialised completely randomly, voting has little 
effect because it does not really matter which courses are selected: for any sub-
set of courses, there are many students who have a high satisfaction. Conse-
quently, even the equal share strategy performed at a level close to optimal. In 
addition, in practice, preferences are not independent but there are groups of 
students with similar interests. To address these issues, a bias was introduced 
in the preferences. The agents allocated to each strategy were likely to have the 
same preferences. This means that the intelligent agents, the proportional 
agents and the equal share agents each fought the other two sets of agents 
To create the bias, for each student and each course we start by randomly 
generating preferences from a uniform distribution between 0 and 10 as ex-
plained in section 5.1.1. Then, for a subset of students we multiply the prefer-
ences of the subset of courses by a factor of 2. Then, we limit all the preferences 
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to being no more than 10. The result is that, because of the limit, this subset of 
students all favours a particular subset of courses.  At the same time, their 
preferences are not the same. 
After modelling the student preferences, we repeated the same process in 
terms of the three cases mentioned in the previous experiment. The change here 
is that there are many simulations and the number of simulations is determined 
according to how the students are split between strategies. Accordingly, each 
case will run with fixed parameters, including number of courses, number of 
running courses, and number of total students, while the variable here is the 
number of student agents employing each strategy. Regarding the number of 
running course, we chose one setting for each case in the middle to represent 
the other. However, the results are very similar for the other settings in Table 
4.1, and there are no qualitative differences.  The number of running courses 
was set to:  30 for case 1, 18 for case 2 and 9 for case 3. To discuss the result, 
we showed the result for case 1 and the results for other cases are very similar 
and are not shown in order to avoid repetition (see Appendix A). 
Each simulation was run 50 times with different student preferences. 
Thus, the results shown are the average results over these runs.  Figure ‎5-5 
shows the sequence for running the experiment with different numbers of simu-
lations.  
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Figure ‎5-5: Sequence for conducting a case with different settings 
5.2.2 Result and Analysis 
We now proceed to discussing the results. In the results that follow, the y-axis 
shows the percentage of satisfaction for each group of agents using a particular 
strategy. Furthermore, on the x-axis we vary the proportion of students using a 
particular strategy. For example, in Figure 5-6, 90-10 means that 90 students 
use the proportional strategy, and 10 students use the equal share strategy.  
The results in Figure ‎5-6 Figure ‎5-7 show that the intelligent and propor-
tional strategies are both significantly more effective than the equal share, irre-
spective of the proportion of students that use this strategy. On average, the 
improvement is around 9% compared to the equal share strategy. (see Appen-
dix A) 
 
Figure ‎5-6: Case 1: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
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Figure ‎5-7: Case 1: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
Figure ‎5-8, Figure ‎5-9 and Figure ‎5-10 show the results with both the intelli-
gent strategy and the proportional strategy for the three different cases. The 
results show that, as the number of students allocated to a particular strategy 
increases, the student satisfaction for these students also increases. However, 
this is mainly because of the bias that has been introduced; since students with 
the same strategy have similar preferences, when more students have these 
preferences they have greater voting power since they act as a group.  
Comparing the intelligent and proportional strategies it can be seen that 
there is not much difference between them. Although in some cases, as in Fig-
ure ‎5-10, the intelligent strategy slightly outperforms the proportional strategy 
(given that the same number of students are using that strategy), in the other 
two cases the proportional strategy outperforms the intelligent strategy. This 
suggests that the system cannot be easily exploited by an intelligent strategy. 
We have also tried to vary the parameters of the intelligent strategy (such as 
the beta parameter), but again the results do not change significantly. 
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Figure ‎5-8: Case 1: Intelligent vs. Proportional 
 
Figure ‎5-9: Case 2: Intelligent vs. Proportional 
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Figure ‎5-10: Case 3: Intelligent vs. Proportional 
5.3 Discussion 
We have explored how multiagent systems could be used for e-learning and can 
solve problems in a decentralised way where an autonomous software agent 
votes on a student's behalf according to the student's preferences. We have fo-
cused on an agent’s ability to act autonomously in a system and to communi-
cate with one another to reach a collective decision whilst trying to maximise 
the outcome. 
After completing the two experiments, they show that when agents are 
used in this way, three points can be highlighted: 
 Decentralisation 
Helping learners build the decentralised navigation way that fulfils their 
learning goals can release them from unnecessary traditional way using learning 
activities and help them to maintain their privacy. It also supports collabora-
tive learning among different individuals, which can lead to multiple ways to 
expand the learning potential of every student. We argued that agent systems 
could provide decentralised solutions to a number of key e-learning problems. 
This experiment shows that not only is this possible, but that if students 
choose sensible strategies the results tend towards an optimal solution, which is 
calculated as the result of a centralised approach. This answers question one.  
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 Personalisation 
In a multiagent system, autonomous agents allow for unprecedented levels 
of personalisation. From an educational perspective, not only can students have 
preferences about any given learning scenario, but by selecting different strate-
gies they can change the way in which their agents negotiate. For example, in 
the course selection, scenario students have different preferences and in the ex-
periment can choose different strategies for voting based on those preferences. 
However, it would also be possible to introduce other student agents that had a 
completely different basis for choosing courses (for example, based on the choic-
es of their friends or on the requirements of some qualification framework).  
Multiagent systems provide the necessary level of abstraction for the tai-
loring of every aspect of the process, including the basis for making choices (e.g. 
preferences or some other criteria), the individual’s personal data (e.g. the pref-
erences themselves), and the algorithm that uses that data to negotiate (e.g. 
how to vote according to those preferences).  This fulfils the outcome sought in 
question two. 
However, we also believe that our work highlights potential concerns: 
 Fairness 
In situations of personalisation and decentralisation it is very difficult to 
guarantee that all students will have the same potential for satisfaction. This is 
because, although the agents are handled equally, the system relies on the 
agents themselves making sensible choices and selections. Power and responsi-
bility are transferred from a central authority (the institution) to individual 
agents (the students). If an agent makes irrational choices, or chooses a bad 
strategy, then their student will be disadvantaged when compared to others. 
We demonstrated this by showing how a foolish equal share strategy penalised 
students who acted in that way. However, we also showed how a well-designed 
protocol makes it difficult for a more intelligent (or intentionally subversive) 
strategy to gain advantage over a sensible strategy. Because of the importance 
of this issue, we discuss it in more detail in a separate chapter (chapter 7).  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a multiagent simulation that uses a suitable voting 
protocol to support course selection. Using this simulation, the results show 
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that a decentralised agent approach not only works but when using reasonable 
agent strategies it is very close to an optimal centralised solution. Furthermore 
it can be seen that how different agent strategies compare to one another, 
showing that with this particular protocol intelligent strategy was unable to 
exploit other, more naïve voters. This is encouraging for the e-learning domain, 
where institutions are often required to be fair.  
The next chapter considers complex preferences. Whereas the student 
agents in this chapter have simple additive preferences, in practice the prefer-
ences are often interdependent. That is, the preferences in relation to one 
course depend on whether or not another course is running. In such setting, de-
centralised approaches even more important since such interdependence are dif-
ficult to handle in centralised way. 
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  Chapter 6.
Agent Simulation for E-
Learning System Involving 
Complex Preferences 
In the previous chapter, student preferences were modelled using a simple mod-
el where the preferences for each course are independent from others (meaning 
that if a course was cancelled, this had no effect on the remaining preferences). 
However, it is not realistic to assume that all courses are independent. In prac-
tice, voters typically like to express dependencies between courses, such as “I 
would like to study Course A only if I can also study Course B” (complemen-
tary preferences) or “I would like to study Course C or Course D, but not both” 
(substitutable preferences).  
In this chapter we extend the voting system from chapter four to these 
more complex preferences. In particular, the strategies were developed to take 
into account the interdependencies that exist when casting votes for the availa-
ble courses. The objective in doing so is to demonstrate the potential of using 
multiagent systems and voting in settings where students have complex prefer-
ences and use a range of voting strategies. In this context, the complexity is in-
creased so such voting protocol is needed because it became difficult to calcu-
late the central solution. We investigate how students using an intelligent 
strategy try to predict the courses which will be running, using this to estimate 
the expected student satisfaction and thus achieve a higher average satisfaction. 
This is done by testing H2: 
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Within system with complex preferences, an individual student that 
uses an intelligent predictive strategy will on average achieve a high-
er satisfaction than those taking a naïve or random strategy. 
The main questions this experiment tries to answer are: 
Q1: If the student agent has complex preferences and uses an intelligent 
strategy, will he or she achieve a higher level of satisfaction? 
Q2: What is the impact of using the other voting strategies on the overall 
student satisfaction when students’ preferences become sophisticated by includ-
ing AND and OR rules?  
This chapter starts by explaining in detail how we conducted the experi-
ment, including the methodology, analyses and results. A discussion and con-
cluding remarks end the chapter. 
6.1 Complex Student Preferences 
In the previous chapter, student preferences were modelled using a simple mod-
el where the preferences for each course are independent from others (meaning 
that if a course was cancelled it had no effect on the remaining preferences). 
However, in reality it is not realistic to assume that all courses are independent. 
In practice, a student typically would like to express dependencies between 
courses such as “I would like to study course A only if I can study course B” 
(so-called complementary preferences) or “I would like to study course C or 
course D, but not both” (so-called substitutable preferences). 
The modelling here is built on the previous model but adds relationships 
between courses and makes the case more complex. Specifically, in this model 
the utility of a course may depend of which other courses are running. To re-
flect this, we modelled two types of relationship: complementary (AND) and 
substitute (OR). Two courses, A and B, are complementary when the student 
is only interested in choosing course A if course B is running, and vice versa. 
Conversely, courses A and B are substitutes if a student is interested in course 
A or course B, but not both.  We assume that each student has a (possible) dif-
ferent set of rules, where each represents either an AND or an OR relationship 
between a pair of courses.  
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Given this, the utility function of a student is modelled as follows. Let 
  {          } denote the set of courses, and   ⃗⃗⃗   {            }  denote 
the individual utilities (in case there are no rules) for these courses, where m is 
the total number of available courses to choose from. Furthermore, let     de-
note the set of OR rules, which specifies a set of pairs of courses       , and 
similarly      denotes the set of AND rules. To avoid conflicts, it is assumed 
that each course is only part of one rule. Therefore, the same course cannot ap-
pear both in an OR rule and an AND rule. Then, the utility for a set of run-
ning courses is calculated as follows:  
 For any running course,   , that does not appear in a rule, the utility 
is simply the sum of the individual utilities    of those courses.   
 For any pair of courses (     )      , if both courses are running, the 
utility for the pair is           . If only one of them is running, then 
the utility is equal to the individual utility for that course.  
 For any pair of courses (     )       , if both courses are running, 
the utility for the pair is       . Otherwise, the utility is zero.  
The total utility is then the sum of the individual courses without rules, 
and the pairs with rules. Using this utility, we then calculate the student satis-
faction by taking the utility as a percentage of the utility the student would 
achieve when all the courses would be running.  
To clarify, consider this example. Here, there are six courses, and two stu-
dent agents. 2 students will make it more clear how to calculate the student 
satisfaction with complex preferences. The preferences of     are as follows: 
  ⃗⃗⃗   {           } and the rules are:    OR   ,    OR   ,    AND   . The pref-
erences of a     are:   ⃗⃗⃗   {           } the rules are as follows:    AND   .  
Let’s consider     first. The total utility if all courses are running is calculated 
as follows. The relationship between    and    is OR, so we take the higher 
value which is     . The relationship between    and    is also OR so we will 
take the higher one which is     . Finally, and    has an AND relationship 
with    so we will take the sum of them 3+ 8 = 11. The total utility is there-
fore 7+4+11=22. Now, the university decides to cancel   . In this case, the ac-
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tual utility will be 2+4+11=17. The student satisfaction is then given as 
17/22*100%  77%. (Figure ‎6-1 illustrates the process.) 
With regards to    , the total utility, if all courses are running, is calcu-
lated as follows.  Where there is only a relationship between    and    which is 
AND, so we take the sum of them 3+5 = 8. And we will calculate the rest of 
the preferences as normal summation bases 8+7+3+1 = 19. The total utility is 
therefore 8+19 = 27. As mentioned earlier, the university decides to cancel   . 
In this case, the actual utility will be 8+7+3+1 = 19.    is eliminated as it has 
an AND relationship with   . The student satisfaction for this student is then 
given as 19/27*100%  70%.  
 
Figure ‎6-1: Calculate student’s satisfaction with complex preferences 
6.2 Methodology 
This experiment is aimed to at demonstrating if the voting approach might 
prove to be an advantage for those students who use more intelligent agents, 
where student preferences are complex. This means using AND and OR rules. 
In doing so, the setting of student agent preferences should be modified in such 
a way as to fulfil the objective of the experiments. For each student and each 
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course, we start by randomly generating preferences from a uniform distribu-
tion as described before in section 5.2.1. Subsequently, for every time the simu-
lation is run, AND and OR relationships are generated. This is done as follows. 
First, we generate all possible AND and OR relationships. Then, we select a 
subset of these rules from which the students can select. We do this to increase 
the likelihood that groups of students identify similar relationships between 
courses. This is true in practice, since often students do have the same relation-
ships between courses, even if they value individual courses differently. For ex-
ample when there are two similar programming courses students will often 
share the desire to take one of them but not both. Now, the degree of similarity 
can be varied by a parameter which sets the size of the subset as a percentage 
of the total number of possible rules. 
Figure ‎6-2 shows an example of this generation, for m = 6 courses availa-
ble in total. In this case, the number of relationships that can be generated here 
is n*(n-1) = 6*5   = 30 relationships. According to the percentage given for this 
experiment (50%), we have 15 rules left.  
 
Figure ‎6-2: Generation of the course model 
Following this, a number of simple constrains are applied to the genera-
tion of the student preferences: no more than one relationship involving any 
given course to avoid cycles and only one type of relationship (OR or AND) 
between the same courses to avoid conflicts.  In this case, we end up with three 
rules after applying the constraints: (   OR   ), (   AND   ), (   OR   ). 
After that, we consider the same three cases explained in section 4.1 and 
also used in chapter 5.  The number of running courses is confined to 40, 11, 
and 9 for cases 1, 2, and 3 respectively (Table ‎6-1). We repeat the same proce-
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dure that used to conduct the previous experiment in terms of splitting the 
student between strategies and also in terms of the way experiments and simu-
lations ware conducted including the variables1.  
Table ‎6-1: Different settings for the cases 
case 
#courses 
(m) 
#running courses 
(r) 
#student (n) 
1 51 30 100 
2 33 11 60 
3 18 9 20 
6.3 Applying Rules to Voting Strategies 
One important issue in this experiment is how the three different strategies 
work at the stage when casting the votes over the courses in the presence of 
rules between courses. The voting strategies have been described in section 4.5, 
but they need to be adapted to deal with complex preferences, and taking into 
account the rules. 
Proportional: This will take the rules between courses into account when 
distributing the points and distribute them proportionally to the student’s pref-
erences for each course. The strategy takes the rules into account in the follow-
ing way in the event of complementary preferences between courses (i.e. AND 
rules). Suppose a cancelled course has an AND relationship with another course 
(e.g.     AND     , and    is cancelled). Then, the SA will exclude the depend-
ent course (  ) from the points distribution process and try to benefit from 
these point by spending them elsewhere. The strategy does not take into ac-
count any OR relationships, since it cannot know which courses will eventually 
be running.  
Equal share: This does not take rules into account, providing the lower 
bound on the performance of the system. It enables SA to gives all courses an 
equal number of votes, regardless of the student’s preference. 
                                      
 
1 They are: initial points (IP), fraction of point to invest           .  
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Intelligent: This strategy differs from the one in previous experiments in 
that it will consider the rules between courses when calculating probability. 
Specifically , for each pair of courses the probability will be calculated different-
ly for an OR relationship and an AND relationship. Probability is used to cal-
culate the expected utility. This works as follows.  Suppose we have an AND 
relationship between    and   . In order to calculate the expected utility, we 
need to know the probability that both of these courses will run, i.e. 
    (     ⃗⃗  )        (     ⃗⃗  ), 
where 
    (     ⃗⃗  )           (     ⃗⃗  ). 
By assuming there is independence in regard to the probabilities for different 
courses, we can do this by simply taking the product. Now, in the case of the 
OR relationship between    and   , we need to consider also the possibility 
that only one of them will run, meaning the other is cancelled. This gives the 
following expected utility for individual or pairs of courses, depending on the 
rules between courses: 
No rule:         (     ⃗⃗  )     
   AND   :            (     ⃗⃗  )       (     ⃗⃗  )          
   OR   :           (     ⃗⃗  )       (     ⃗⃗  )              
      (     ⃗⃗  )          (     ⃗⃗  )               (     ⃗⃗  )       (     ⃗⃗  ⃗)     
The total expected utility is therefore the sum of the expected utility for 
all courses without rules, and the expected utility of all course pairs with rules. 
The rules continue to work as described in order to ascertain the allocation that 
maximises this expected utility (see section 4.5 for more details).  
6.4 Result and Analysis 
In the results that follow, the y-axis shows the student satisfaction for each 
group of agents using a particular strategy, as well as the overall average of 
student satisfaction. Furthermore, on the x-axis we vary the proportion of stu-
dents using a particular strategy for a different percentage of the applied rules. 
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This is repeated for three different setting: NO rules, 50% rules and 100% rules. 
The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals. 
The results in Figure ‎6-3 and Figure ‎6-4 show that the intelligent and 
proportional strategies are both clearly more effective than the equal share 
strategy. Specifically, it can be seen that, as the number of rules increases, the 
better the intelligent and proportional strategies perform relative to equal 
share. On average, the improvement is around 4%, 6%, and 9%, for NO rules, 
50% rules, and 100% rules respectively. Furthermore, the average satisfaction of 
all students also increases, which means that the allocation is more efficient 
when students use a more intelligent voting approach. The results for other 
cases are very similar and are not shown to avoid repetition (for more details, 
see Appendix B). 
 
Figure ‎6-3: Case 2: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
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Figure ‎6-4: Case 2: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
Figure ‎6-5, Figure ‎6-6 and Figure ‎6-7 compare the results using the intel-
ligent strategy and the proportional strategy for the three different cases. Fig-
ure ‎6-5 shows that, at first glance, the performance of the intelligent strategy 
increases compared to the proportional strategy, as the students apply more 
rules.  However, in most cases this result is not statistically significant. We 
choose the combination of 30 students for each strategy with 50% rules case 
and conduct some statistical test. According to the statistics shown in Ta-
ble ‎6-2, the hypothesis that there is no difference in mean intelligent strategy 
and proportional strategy fail to be rejected because p value   0.05 and t-test 
value   1.98 at a 95% level of confidence.   
The reasons the results of the two strategies are similar are as follows. 
First, the number of courses that the students vote over is large. This means 
that the range of student choice is wide and students have a wide range of pref-
erences. Second, the number of students voting is also large. This means that 
each individual student has very little voting power. To analyse this, we will 
consider a setting where the number of students and courses are small. 
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Figure ‎6-5: Case 1: Proportional vs. Intelligent 
 
Table ‎6-2: Statistical values of comparing intelligent and proportional strategies in case 
1  
strategy mean SD variance 
Intelligent 75.356 1.378 1.899 
proportional 75.092 1.224 1.498 
t = 1.013 df =98 p =0.3136 
Figure ‎6-6 and Figure ‎6-7 show that, when there are relatively few courses 
and students, there are clear differences in the performance of the intelligent 
and proportional strategies. This difference between them becomes bigger as 
long as the number of student and course is smaller, as seen in Figure ‎6-7. The 
intelligent strategy significantly outperforms the proportional strategy when a 
student applies the rules and this superiority is increased as more rules are ap-
plied. Statistically, according to data displayed in Table ‎6-3 and Table ‎6-4 we 
reject the null hypothesis and we accept alternative one at 95% level of confi-
dence. Therefore this is a significant difference in means between intelligent and 
proportional strategies because p value   0.05 also the value of t-test   1.98. 
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Figure ‎6-6: Case 2: Intelligent vs. Proportional 
 
Table ‎6-3: Statistical values of comparing intelligent and proportional strategies in case 
2 
strategy mean SD variance 
Intelligent 31.991 0.918 0.843 
Proportional 31.601 0.990 0.980 
t = 2.043                df =98               p =0.0431 
 
 
Figure ‎6-7: Case 3: Proportional vs. Intelligent 
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Table ‎6-4: Statistical values of comparing intelligent and proportional strategies in case 
3 
strategy mean SD variance 
Intelligent 52.771 2.034 4.137 
Proportional 49.803 2.352 5.532 
t = 6.749             df =58            p = 1.05       
6.5 Discussion 
After completing the experiments, we can see that when students have complex 
preferences various points can be highlighted. The hypothesis that the intelli-
gent strategy’s improvement is greater than the improvement in the propor-
tional strategy is true in almost all cases where rules were applied, according to 
statistical data this suggests that when students have fewer choices and there-
fore there is less differentiation between the students, and when the number of 
students is not too large, the intelligent strategy performs better than the pro-
portional one. Note also that, as the proportion of students using the intelligent 
strategy increases, the student satisfaction of all students either stays the same 
or increases. Therefore, using a more intelligent approach does not harm the 
system as a whole. This answers question one 
In practice, there are interdependencies between courses for students. 
They want to study some courses together at the same time, or they may want 
to study one course but not another. In this context, this experiment shows 
that, when more dependencies between courses are identified by applying more 
rules, the better the intelligent and proportional strategies perform. On average, 
the improvement is around 4%, 6%, and 9%, for NO rules, 50% rules, and 100% 
rules respectively. This also shows that the performances of intelligent and pro-
portional strategies are better than the equal share in all cases where rules are 
applied. This answers question two.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter takes the same multiagent system simulation but complicates the 
situation by incorporating the fact that students have complex preferences and 
use a range of voting strategies. It has shown how the autonomous software 
agent votes on a student's behalf according to the kind of complementary and 
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substitutable preferences between courses. We found that, when students have 
complex preferences and the number of students is not too large (such that 
each individual student can affect the voting outcome), the intelligent strategy 
performs significantly better than the proportional one. Moreover, it can be 
seen that, as the number of rules increases, the intelligent and proportional 
strategies also perform better relative to equal share. 
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  Chapter 7.
Fairness in Intelligent E-
Learning Systems Using Agent 
Simulation  
As e-learning systems become more advanced, they enable a more heterogene-
ous student experience. Personal choice in regard to e-learning tools is a core 
part of personal learning and is becoming a defining feature of informal learning 
(Wilson, Liber et al. 2007). Moreover, intelligent and personalised e-learning 
systems mean that different students can have different experiences as tasks, 
and resources being intelligently modified according to their preferences (Shute 
and Paotica 1994). This means that intelligent e-learning systems must face the 
issue of fairness, where fairness is broadly defined as ensuring for any given 
process that participants are treated equally and there is an appropriate bal-
ance of satisfaction with the outcome.  
The previous two experiments appear to show that a distributed agent 
system may produce unfair results, because an agent applying an intelligent 
strategy is likely to perform better than those who do not. The main objective 
of this chapter is to investigate how intelligent agent-based e-learning systems 
can ensure fairness between individuals using different strategies in a system 
that is personalised to them. This is done by testing H3 and H4:  
 As the proportion of individuals agents utilising differently per-
forming strategies in the system increases, the overall fairness of 
the result (as defined by equity theory) decreases.  
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 When having a uniform mixture of different strategies we can ad-
just the protocol by exponent and weight to make the protocol 
fairer. 
In order to explore the issue of fairness, and look at whether different students 
mixing different strategies and having different preferences will receive equal 
treatment, the investigation is divided into two parts. The first part discusses 
the fairness of the protocol itself. This is examined by adding two factors: expo-
nent and weight. The former is used to give individual student agents who rate 
courses highly more impact than students who rate the courses at the lower end 
(exaggerating the impact of strong preferences). The latter is intended to give 
the student who has not achieved their desire and is therefore not successful 
more impact on the voting process (increasing their ability to catch up).  
The second part focuses on the fairness of the strategies’ distribution using 
the current protocol, where the proportion of students using one strategy is in-
creased and the students using another strategy is decreased. 
The main questions these experiments try to answer are:  
Q1: How can we make sure the protocol is as fair as could be? And does 
it produce a fair result? 
Q2: Does the exponent affect the performance of the strategies and does it 
affect fairness when we have a mixed set of strategies?  
Q3: Does weight decrease the difference between strategies and does it af-
fect the fairness when we have a mixed set of strategies?  
Q4: How does fairness change as the distribution of strategies changes? 
This chapter first introduces a simple framework for measuring the fair-
ness of a result by setting fairness definitions with formal metrics to describe 
them. Then, it describes in detail how to conduct the two parts of the experi-
ment, including methodology, analyses and results. A discussion and concluding 
remarks end the chapter.  
7.1 A Framework of Fairness in Intelligent E-Learning 
Systems 
Before investigating fairness in intelligent e-learning systems, from the litera-
ture we derive a simple framework of fairness definitions that are useful for the 
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e-learning domain, describe different aspects of fairness, and define the ways of 
being measured.  
These definitions of fairness are used as an assessment of the outcome of a 
system or process. Within our proposed fairness framework, we have identified 
three different notions of fairness, each of which can be described statistically 
given a system where each participant has a satisfaction value with their per-
sonal result. These three notions have been described in detail in section 2.5. In 
brief, they are:  
 Utilitarian: the best outcome that gives the greatest whole welfare to 
society. For our satisfaction values, this means maximising the mean 
satisfaction of all participants (which is equivalent to maximising the 
sum of the satisfactions). 
 Equalitarian: the best outcome that gives the least difference between 
the individual members of society. For our satisfaction values, this 
means minimising the standard deviation of satisfaction values and 
minimising the range of satisfaction values.  
 Egalitarian: the best outcome that gives the greatest overall welfare 
so that all individual members should have equal benefits. It is intend-
ed to maximise the welfare of a society’s weakest member. For our sat-
isfaction values, this would mean maximising the minimum satisfaction, 
although another approach would be to maximise the median satisfac-
tion. 
These three aspects of fairness in our framework allow us to assess the 
outcome of any system as long as we have individual satisfaction values for par-
ticipants in that system. Table ‎7-1 shows a summary of the framework and the 
metrics: 
Table ‎7-1: Aspects of Fairness and their Metrics  
Aspect Metrics 
Utilitarian Maximise mean 
Equalitarian 
Minimise standard deviation 
Minimise range 
Egalitarian 
Maximise minimum 
Maximise median 
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Given this simple framework for fairness, it is possible to examine the outcomes 
of an intelligent e-learning system and evaluate them for fairness. We are una-
ble to ascertain absolute fairness, where a system is judged as fair or unfair, be-
cause it is not clear what the criteria would be for any given scenario (for ex-
ample, at what point does a range become unfair in equalitarian terms?). How-
ever, we can compare systems to see which are fairer by our measures. We 
might expect to see fairer results in systems where participants are treated 
equally, but more unfair results in systems where participants can use different 
strategies and take different risks. 
7.2 (Part1) Fairness of the protocol 
In this experiment, we will test the fairness of the protocol by including factors 
that make the protocol fairer by rewarding people very highly or rewarding 
people who do not succeed at first. In particular, we will look at what happens 
to each group representing one strategy within a cohort of strategies, and what 
that means for the performance of overall strategies when mixing them togeth-
er.  We attempt to make the protocol fairer by applying two mechanisms: ex-
ponent and weight. For the exponent, when it is turned up, the power of the 
vote is amplified for strong preferences, enabling the agent to have more ability 
to affect the system. Conversely, if the exponent is turned down, voting power 
is dampened, making preferences less important overall. For the weight, as it is 
increased, the students who have been unsuccessful in their voting are given 
more power, whereas if it is turned down, we give them less power.  
7.2.1 Methodology 
Exponent 
In all previous experiments, when the university agent intends to cancel a 
course, it looks at all courses, finds out which course has the lowest points, and 
cancels it. However, here the mechanism is slightly changed. In this experiment, 
for each course, the university agent applies an exponent to the point voted by 
each individual student and then sums these adjusted points. It then uses the 
summed adjusted points to determine which course to cancel. More formally, 
the adjusted points are given by the following equation:  
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where     is the points allocated by student agent i to course j,    is a parame-
ter which sets the value of the exponent, and      is the adjusted points, and 
then, the following equation is used to sums the adjusted points for one course 
(    : 
     ∑     
 
   
 
The chart in Figure ‎7-1 shows the process in terms of how the cancellation of 
courses proceeds when applying the exponent.  
The main point of using exponents is that this gives the individual stu-
dent agent who highly rates courses a disproportionally greater impact than a 
student who rates courses at a lower scale. In other words, students with a 
stronger preference are much more important to the system than the others. As 
a result, the system responds to those with extreme views and more heavily 
weighs their preferences when deciding which courses to cancel. We used differ-
ent exponents, with some being smaller than 1 and some larger; 0.0001, 0.1, 0.5, 
1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 6.0 
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Figure ‎7-1: Flow chart showing how the exponent mechanism works 
The experiment was run with different exponents; some are below 1 and 
some above. An exponent of 1 is equivalent to running the system as before. 
The exponent applies on points cast by a student to either dampen or magnify 
the value. For example, let us say in the normal situation when   is 1, and       
is 2 and      is 4, there will be no change. However, if   with a value of 2 is ap-
plied then     becomes 4 and     becomes 16. Thus,      now is worth twice as 
much (i.e. it becomes 4) and       is worth four times more (i.e. it becomes 16). 
On the other hand, if   set to 0.5 and      and     are 2 and 4 respectively, 
their votes will be valued less; 1.41 with a value of about 0.71 times and 2 with 
a value about 0.50 times respectively (Table ‎7-2).  
The effect of the exponent would be: 
 Setting   equal to 1 is the same as the previous experiment in which 
votes are counted on a one-for-one basis. 
 Setting   greater than 1, where the difference between votes is magni-
fied. 
 Setting   lower than 1, the difference between votes is dampened. 
Table ‎7-2: The effect of the exponent  
  Vote   
Student 
A 
2 
Exponent 0.5 1 2 
Value 1.41 2.00 4.00 
Worth 0.71 time 1 time 2 times 
Student 
B 
4 
Exponent 0.5 1 2 
Value 2.00  4.00 16.00 
Worth 0.50 time 1 time 4 times 
 
Weight 
The main point from doing weighting is to give more power to the student who 
has not been successful. When a course has been cancelled which was highly 
desirable by a student, a weight mechanism lets them have more impact on fu-
ture rounds of the voting process. This is achieved by multiplying the number 
of points returned by a constant weight. We run the experiment with different 
weights, with some being smaller than 1 and some larger; 0.0001, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 
1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 6.0. A weight of 1 is equivalent to running the experiment 
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as before. If the weight is above 1, a student will receive relatively more points 
if they had voted highly on a course which was cancelled, whereas if the weight 
is below 1 the returned points have less value. Note that having a value close to 
zero means that effectively no points are returned. We include this setting in 
our experiments to see the effect of returning votes in the protocol. The follow-
ing formula was used to calculate the returning points. 
            , 
where     is the points returned to student agent i after cancelling  course 
j,    is a parameter which sets the value of the weight, and      is the weighted 
points. 
 The flow chart in Figure ‎7-2 shows how to apply weights on the returned 
points. 
 
Figure ‎7-2: Flow chart showing how the weight mechanism works 
In the following, an example shows how to calculate the weight. In the 
normal situation, when   is 1,     is 2 points and     is 4 points and the univer-
sity agent cancels        , there will be no change. However, if   is set to 2 and 
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applied on the points, then      will be 4 points with an increase in worth of 
about double and     will be 8 points with an increase in worth also about 
double. On the other hand, if a weight of 0.5 is applied, then     and      will 
0.50 times for both (Table ‎7-3).  
The effect of the weight would be: 
 Setting    equal to 1 is the same as the previous experiment, where 
points are counted on a one-for-one basis. 
 Setting    greater than 1, where the number of points increases. 
 Setting    lower than 1, where the number of points decreases. 
Table ‎7-3: The effect of weight 
  Vote   
Student 
A 
2 
Weight 0.5 1 2 
Value 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Worth 
0.50 
time 
1 time 2 times 
Student 
B 
4 
Weight 0.5 1 2 
Value 2.00 4.00 8.00 
Worth 
0.50 
time 
1 time 2 times 
 
Having the student agent preferences in place, we consider case number 3 
used in the previous experiment and also described in section 5.1.1, where the 
number of students, courses and running courses is 21, 18 and 9 respectively.  
We define the set of all students as a cohort and a subset of students with a 
particular strategy as a strategy group. Thus, one cohort contains an equal 
proportion of student groups using different strategies. For example, if the total 
number of students is 21, they will be distributed equally: 7 students for the 
intelligent strategy, 7 students for the proportional strategy, and 7 students for 
the equal-share strategy. Table ‎7-4 shows the setting for this case: 
Table ‎7-4: Case 3 settings 
Scenario 
#courses 
(m) 
#running 
courses (r) 
#students 
(n) 
Case 3 18 9 21 
 
Furthermore, for both experiments, we use the complex preference de-
scribed in section 6.1. Each strategy was run with rules set at 50%. That means 
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that each student valued only 50% of the available rules. This value was chosen 
because, in test runs, 50% was found to demonstrate the fairness aspect more 
clearly. Finally, each experiment was performed 500 times with different ran-
domly generated student preferences to obtain statistically significant results. 
7.2.2 Results and Analysis 
7.2.2.1 Exponent 
This section will first present the performance of the strategies, and then will 
look at the effect on the system in terms of the fairness measures. 
Performance of strategies 
Figure ‎7-3, Figure ‎7-4 and Figure ‎7-5 show the results for comparison of the 
performance of strategies in the system for selected exponents. In Figure ‎7-3 
and Figure ‎7-5, the y-axis shows the average of the mean, while in Figure ‎7-4 
the y-axis shows the differences in mean between strategies.  The x-axis in 
these figures shows different exponents between 0.0001 and 6. 
Figure ‎7-3 shows the actual mean for each strategy.  It shows in terms of 
the mean that the intelligent and proportional group has a peak at around 1 
and 1.5 respectively, and then decrease especially when the exponent is larger. 
However, the equal-share group stays about the same in all cases for different 
exponents. This is because the equal-share strategy distributes the points equal-
ly regardless of student preference, meaning it gets the same even applying the 
exponent.  
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Figure ‎7-3: Comparison between intelligent, proportional and equal-share strategies in 
means over exponents 
The result in Figure ‎7-4 displays the differences between strategies. It 
shows that, in most cases, the intelligent and proportional strategies are both 
better than the equal-share strategy whatever the exponent applied. When 
looking at the case comparing the difference between the intelligent and equal-
share strategies, the trend reaches the highest level, which is 10.30 at exponent 
1.5, while the highest value for proportional and equal share is 7.57 at exponent 
1.0. This shows that the intelligent strategy benefits from the exponent and 
outperforms the other strategies in performance, although that difference begins 
to decrease as the exponent becomes higher than 2.0. This is because high ex-
ponents can produce very large numbers, which causes the intelligent strategy 
to lose its ability to influence the outcome.  
Looking at the difference in performance between strategies, Figure ‎7-4 
shows that the biggest difference between intelligent and proportional is at 2. It 
shows that intelligent strategy is capable of taking advantage of an exponent, 
as long as that exponent is not too high (i.e. between 1.5 and 3.0) 
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Exponent 
Mean : 7P - 7E - 7I 
Proportional Equal share Intelligent ALL
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Figure ‎7-4: Comparison between intelligent and equal-share strategies for differences 
between means over exponents 
To clarify this, Figure ‎7-5 displays the performance of different strategies, 
where we have All intelligent, All Proportional, and All equal share. It shows 
that proportional strategy and equal share have relatively stable performance 
whatever the strategy, but that intelligent benefits from a slightly higher expo-
nent especially before 1, but drops significantly once the exponent becomes high 
(over 2.0). 
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Figure ‎7-5: Comparison between All Intelligent, All Proportional and All equal-share 
in means over exponents 
Fairness 
This section will give an overview of the effects on the system in terms of fair-
ness aspects, including egalitarian, utilitarian and equalitarian aspects when 
applying different exponents, and shows whether the fairness of the system al-
ters as the exponent changes. 
A) Utilitarian 
 To see how the exponent affected the utilitarian aspects when applying a 
mixed set of strategies, Figure ‎7-6 the results in terms of the utilitarian fairness 
measure for a setting with uniformly mixed strategies (7 intelligent, 7 propor-
tional, 7 equal-share). This figure shows that the mean peaks at an exponent 
value of 1.5. However, the changes from a 0.5 exponent to a 2.5 exponent are 
not significant and give almost the same mean as the 1.0 exponent, which can 
be considered as standard. Therefore, it could be said that the system is not 
significantly affected by the exponent with regards to making it a more utilitar-
ian system. Also, we can clearly see from the graph that, when the exponent 
gets very large, the mean satisfaction goes down. This is because votes become 
bigger and strategies lose the power to make a difference. So, it could be said 
that a mid-range exponent makes no difference in terms of the utilitarian as-
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pect, but has a negative effect when very small (less than 0.5) or very large 
(greater than 2.5).   
 
Figure ‎7-6: Utilitarian measure. The mean of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 7E 
and 7I 
B) Equalitarian 
Equalitarian aspects can be measured by the size of the difference between 
the maximum and minimum satisfaction, which we call the range. It can be 
said that a system is fair from the equalitarian perspective if it makes this 
range as small as possible. 
Figure ‎7-7 illustrates the range of a cohort consisting of the three strate-
gies: intelligent, proportional, and equal-share. Again, these are uniformly 
mixed. Considering the errorbars, the range is not significantly different for the 
different cases. In terms of fairness, this means that the exponent has no signif-
icant effect on the system from an equalitarian point of view. This is probably 
because the group of proportional and equal-share strategies perform quite con-
sistently, reducing the impact of the improvements of the intelligent strategy on 
the range. 
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Figure ‎7-7: Equalitarian measure. The range of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 7E 
and 7I 
C) Egalitarian 
Egalitarian in terms of fairness here means to maximise the worst individ-
ual outcome and/or the median. If the median of the agent satisfaction increas-
es, that means the system is fairer from an egalitarian point of view. 
Figure ‎7-8 shows us a curved trend with a peak at an exponent of 1.5 
(52.57). However, these changes are not significant enough in the mid-range 
(0.5 to 2.5) for us to say that the exponent can make a difference in egalitarian 
terms. 
 
Figure ‎7-8: Egalitarian measure. The Median of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 7E 
and 7I 
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In conclusion, having an exponent does improve the performance of the 
intelligent strategy slightly, but this makes no significant difference to fairness. 
If we look across the board, we could say in general that, in the mid-range from 
1 to 3, there is almost no difference. This demonstrates that the protocol is fair 
and, moreover, that it is in fact very difficult to make it fairer. Below 1, where 
the effective power of the vote decreases, or above 3, where the power of the 
vote similarly declines, we found degradation in fairness. However, in the mid-
dle rage where the protocol is functioning it is difficult to improve the fairness. 
This leads us to our next experiment where we increase the weight for returned 
points, which will give more power to people who have not been successful and 
should theoretically create a fairer system.  
7.2.2.2 Weight 
This experiment tries to produce a fair system by giving the students who 
have been unsuccessful in their voting more power. If an agent is doing badly, 
it gets compensated; therefore, in terms of strategies we would expect to see the 
difference between the strategies decrease. If we look at the performance of the 
intelligent versus proportional versus the equal-share strategies, we would ex-
pect them to equalise somewhat. In other words, we expect to see the average 
for each strategy group to become closer.  
Performance of the strategies 
Figure ‎7-9, Figure ‎7-10 and Figure ‎7-11 show a comparison between the per-
formances of strategies in the system for different weights. In Figure ‎7-9, and 
Figure ‎7-11, the y-axis shows the average of the actual mean, while in Fig-
ure ‎7-10, the y-axis shows the differences between actual mean for strategies 
showed in Figure ‎7-9. The x-axis in these figures shows different weights be-
tween 0.0001 and 6. 
It can be seen from Figure ‎7-9 (presenting the actual mean of each strategy in 
the cohort) that the group of intelligent and proportional strategies have in all 
cases a better performance in comparison with the equal-share strategy. A clear 
change in performance is seen before weight 1 and then it stays stable as a flat 
trend (within the errorbars). 
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Figure ‎7-9: Comparison between intelligent and equal-share strategies in means over 
weights 
Figure ‎7-10 shows the differences in mean satisfaction between different 
strategies.  It can be seen that in all cases the intelligent and proportional 
strategies are both significantly better than the equal-share strategy. The trend 
gradually increases as long as the weight increases especially before 1 weight. 
This is because these two strategies can better take advantage of the increase in 
points returned. Looking at the differences in the means for the intelligent and 
proportional strategies for different weights, according to the error bars there is 
no difference between them when the weight is greater than 1. However, when 
the weight drops below 1, the difference decreases. 
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Figure ‎7-10: Comparison between intelligent and equal-share strategies for differences 
between means over weights 
To clearly this, Figure ‎7-11 shows the performance of different strategies 
where we have All intelligent, All Proportional, and All equal share. It clearly 
demonstrates the finding that the intelligent and proportional strategies pro-
duce increases in the performance which are better than the equal-share strate-
gy. 
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Figure ‎7-11: Comparison between All Intelligent, All Proportional and All equal-share 
in means over weights 
Fairness 
This section will discuss whether or not the system is affected in terms of the 
fairness aspect, including the egalitarian, utilitarian and equalitarian aspects 
when applying different weights and showing if the fairness of the system 
changes as the weight does. 
A) Utilitarian 
 We will look at the mean to see how increasing the returned point affects 
the utilitarian aspects when applying a mixed set of strategies. Figure ‎7-12 
shows that the average started with 44.44 at a weight of 0.0001 and climbs 
gradually to just over 47.80 at a weight of 6. With an overview of the graph, 
we can say before 1.0 there is a significant decrease in the performance of the 
cohort overall, but above 1.0 there is no real difference 
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Figure ‎7-12: Utilitarian measure. The mean of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 7E 
and 7I 
B) Equalitarian 
Figure ‎7-13 shows that there is a gradual drop in the range from a peak of 
55.42 to a low of 53.17 between the weight of 0.0000001 and 6.0. However, this 
is not a significant decrease and especially after the weight is set at 1 it is flat.  
This result does not match what we expected in terms of the equalitarian as-
pect, because the group of different strategies within the entire cohort produces 
a flat difference in the range. 
 
Figure ‎7-13: Equalitarian measure. The range of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 
7E and 7I 
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C) Egalitarian 
Figure ‎7-14 shows that there is a gradual rise in the trend from 49.99 at 
weight 0.0001 to 53.22 at weight 6.0 in terms of the median value. The increase 
is clear between 0.0001 and 1, but after that the trend stays about the same.  
In general, the system is affected by the weight of the returned value only if the 
weight is less than 1 and flat after.  As a result, increasing the weight does not 
have an effect on the egalitarian aspect. 
 
Figure ‎7-14: Egalitarian measure. The Median of a cohort consisting of groups of 7P, 
7E and 7I 
In conclusion, a weighting greater than 1 makes no significant difference 
from the utilitarian, egalitarian and equalitarian points of view. However, a 
weighting below 1 has a detrimental effect on all of our metrics. 
To sum up from the exponent and weight experiments, in both cases in-
creasing beyond 1 had no significant effect on the fairness of the system, but 
that below one all fairness measures declined. This is because the protocol is 
already very fair. Thus, the framework works as it shows the protocol is less 
fair when the exponent is set below 1. However, a potential problem with the 
fairness measures used is that they are likely to be correlated. Therefore, if the 
utilitarian value is increased there will also be an increase in the egalitarian and 
probably the equalitarian values too. 
7.3  (Part2) Fairness of Strategy Distribution 
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The aim of this experiment is to ascertain the fairness of outcome with different 
strategy distributions, by applying the fairness measures described above. We 
will look at how fairness changes as long as the number of students allocated to 
the two strategies changes. The expectation of this experiment is that we would 
see less fairness when there is a split of student agents with an equal number 
utilising two strategies in one cohort.  
In order to investigate this assumption, we consider case number 3, which 
was described in section 5.1.1, where the number of students, courses and run-
ning courses is 20, 18 and 9 respectively. Students are split between two strate-
gies so that a group of students are allocated to one strategy increases, while 
the rest (allocated to another strategy) decreases. For example, if there are 20 
students in total the first experiment will have 19 students for the equal-share 
strategy and one for the intelligent strategy. Then, for each following experi-
ment, the student number will decrease for the equal-share and increase for in-
telligent strategies, until there is student using the equal-share, and 19 using 
the intelligent. This way we can see how the proportion of different strategies 
affects the fairness of the system. 
7.3.1 Results and Analysis 
Figure ‎7-15, Figure ‎7-16 and Figure ‎7-17 show the mean, median and range for 
utilitarian, egalitarian and equalitarian respectively as measures for fairness 
when two groups of strategies are combined in one cohort. The y-axis shows the 
overall average of each measure when there are two different groups of strate-
gies in one cohort. On the x-axis, the total number of students  using the two 
different strategies in one cohort is shown.  
Figure ‎7-15 and Figure ‎7-16 show the mean and median for fairness 
measures as the number of students using the intelligent strategy increases and 
the equal-share strategy share decreases. When there are two groups of stu-
dents within one cohort, we expect to see a peak in the middle at which point 
the different groups have the same number of students. However, we found a 
steady increase. This is because the intelligent strategy gets better results, and 
so the more students adopt the intelligent strategy, the better the overall co-
hort gets.  
 
 110 
 
Figure ‎7-15: Case 3: mean when Equal-Share and Intelligent 
 
Figure ‎7-16: Case 3: median when Equal-Share and Intelligent 
In Figure ‎7-17 we can see what happened to the range when applying the 
same setting where the number of students using the intelligent strategy in-
creases and the equal-share strategy share decreases. We expect it to decrease 
until the number of students using each strategy is the same, and then increase 
again. However, in fact Figure ‎7-17 shows a steadily decreasing range. As men-
tioned above, the reason for this is that, at every step, one student who does 
not do well is removed and a student who does do well is inserted.  Therefore, 
because the intelligent strategy gets better results, the more students adopt the 
intelligent strategy the better the overall cohort gets. 
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
1
9
-1
1
8
-2
1
7
-3
1
6
-4
1
5
-5
1
4
-6
1
3
-7
1
2
-8
1
1
-9
1
0
-1
0
9
-1
1
8
-1
2
7
-1
3
6
-1
4
5
-1
5
4
-1
6
3
-1
7
2
-1
8
1
-1
9
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
m
ea
n
 
number of students allocated to two equal-share and intelligent 
strategies 
MEAN 
Equal-Share & Intelligent
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
1
9
-1
1
8
-2
1
7
-3
1
6
-4
1
5
-5
1
4
-6
1
3
-7
1
2
-8
1
1
-9
1
0
-1
0
9
-1
1
8
-1
2
7
-1
3
6
-1
4
5
-1
5
4
-1
6
3
-1
7
2
-1
8
1
-1
9
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
m
e
d
ia
n
 
number of students allocated to two equal-share and intelligent 
strategies 
MEDIAN 
Equal-Share & Intelligent
 111 
 
Figure ‎7-17: Case 3: range when Equal-Share and Intelligent 
To see what happens to the range, it was taken to show the distribution 
of students when allocated to the two strategies during the run. Figure ‎7-18 
shows the result of this. The y-axis shows the name of the two strategies within 
the cohort.  The x-axis shows the overall range for the entire cohort as well as 
the individual ranges for the groups within the cohort taking each strategy.  
What exactly happens is counteractive, every time the number student us-
ing intelligent strategy is increased the number students using equal-share is 
reduced. Therefore, there is a counter process resulting in the system appearing 
to be fairer as more students take a good strategy.  
To avoid repetition, we restrict the explanation to covering what happens 
between intelligent and equal-share strategies. The results for other cases are 
very similar (for more details, see Appendix C). 
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Figure ‎7-18: Case 3: the range for the distribution of intelligent and equal-share strate-
gies 
7.4 Discussion 
In these experiments we have looked at the fairness of an e-learning distributed 
system. In e-learning we are not only interested in the utilitarian value but also 
in other measures, including egalitarian and equalitarian measures. We want to 
see whether the framework is functioning and able to distinguish between dif-
ferent situations by comparing strategies and then seeing if the framework 
could be used to measure changes in the fairness. After completing these exper-
iments, some points can be highlighted. 
 Fairness framework 
From these experiments, we could say that the framework does reveal a 
certain type of fairness outcome, which is the overall fairness of the system ra-
ther than fairness in relation to any individual entering the system. However, 
the metrics used to measure fairness are linked; they are not independent. 
When a student using a bad strategy is removed and more students use a good 
strategy, the system as a whole gets fairer for all aspects of fairness. 
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 Fairness as Social welfare  
This interdependence suggests that it might be more useful to look at 
fairness from the individual’s point of view, rather than by assessing the out-
come for the whole cohort. However, in order to assess this we need to have 
more knowledge about the agent such as the strategy he will use, which is not 
realistic in a decentralised mechanism. Whereas if we consider the whole as a 
social welfare system, we only look at the entire outcome, which is practical in 
a real situation.  
 Fairness of the protocol 
If we accept this pragmatic argument then the result shows we have a 
very fair protocol. We test the fairness of the protocol by adding two adjust-
ments: exponent and weight. We have learned that, if we turn these measures 
up, although we expect this to make a positive difference to fairness, this actu-
ally does not seem to have much effect. Nevertheless, we know the fairness 
measures are working because, as they are turned down to zero, the protocol 
becomes less fair and the level of fairness drops. This shows that, although a 
system where a student can take a different strategy can produce unfair results, 
if you have the correct protocol you can produce a result that is fair as a whole 
system.  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented an argument that, as e-learning systems become 
more sophisticated, they will introduce problems of fairness, where some stu-
dents are disadvantaged because their e-learning systems use inappropriate 
strategies to negotiate or collaborate with others. We have presented a frame-
work for fairness that looks at the outcomes in order to measure fairness in 
terms of the satisfaction students have with the outcome. The framework iden-
tifies utilitarian, egalitarian and equalitarian metrics that can be used to assess 
fairness. 
We have then used this framework to look at fairness in our own agent 
system, where students use a voting protocol to collectively agree on the num-
ber of courses to be run by a university.  
The experiments have shown that the framework works but measures a 
certain type of fairness, which is the overall fairness of the system rather than 
 114 
the individual level. We have also discovered that the protocol we have devel-
oped is already very fair and it is difficult to make this protocol much fairer us-
ing the two measures demonstrated (exponent and weight).  
If we take an e-learning perspective that accepts a social welfare view of 
fairness, then we can say we have a distributed system and a voting protocol 
that gives results that are fair. However, our framework metrics are linked so 
that, as a strategy performs better, the more overall utilitarian fairness there is 
and thus the fairer the system is likely to be in equalitarian and egalitarian 
terms. There is another view of fairness which focuses on the advantages of the 
individual rather than the whole (for example, calculating the probability that 
a given students will achieve their goals and then comparing that probability 
with others). If this kind of fairness view is considered, it could be said that it 
is simply impossible in a distributed system to calculate whether it is fair or not 
because we do not know the strategy an individual will take or their prefer-
ences. Therefore, we could say there is only one potential view of fairness for a 
distributed e-learning system, which is the pragmatic view of fairness based on 
social welfare taken here. 
 115 
  Chapter 8.
Conclusion and Future Work
  
This chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis and a summary of the work 
done on simulating a voting-based agent system to support an e-learning sce-
nario. Section 8.1 gives an overview of the actions undertaken by summarising 
the main points from each of the previous chapters.  Section 8.2 revisits the hy-
pothesis and gives a summary of the core findings of the research. Finally in 
Section 8.3 suggestions are made for future work that may arise as a result of 
the research. 
8.1 Research Summary 
This thesis presented an agent based voting system for personalised e-learning 
scenario where autonomous agents vote on behalf of the students according to 
the student's preferences. We introduced three different e-learning scenarios 
showing how agent technologies could be used in e-learning to take full ad-
vantage of the agent’s ability to map to problems in e-learning.  We chose sce-
nario one (course selection) as basis for carrying the investigation in this thesis. 
We then introduced a novel voting protocol for this scenario in which agents 
allocate points to different courses and voting occurs in several rounds. This 
way the agents are able to freely express their preferences and at the same time 
use the information provided from previous rounds to vote intelligently and 
strategically. We then developed three different voting strategies, with their 
performance evaluated through simulation in a range of settings 
The key objective of this thesis is to show how agent systems can not only 
form a good framework for distributed e-learning systems, but also how they 
 116 
can be applied in personal learning contexts where the learners are autonomous 
and independent. To show this, we investigated three main points in separate 
chapters. 
Specifically, these points were: 
Agent system for Decentralised E-learning Scenario 
In Chapter 5 the investigation centred on decentralised approaches, where stu-
dent agents control their learning through collective decision-making. Such an 
approach marked a shift from more centralised approaches, where decisions are 
made by central authorities. Investigations into the decentralised approaches 
used the multiagent systems described in Chapter 4 to run two experiments. 
The first one compared a situation in which all students were allocated one 
strategy and compared it with an optimal centralised situation.  The second 
involved a comparison of a number of student agents using one particular strat-
egy and the rest using a different strategy. A decentralised approach was shown 
to work well; the independent voting strategy provides outcomes which are 
close to the optimal centralised solution. It was also shown that with this par-
ticular protocol more naïve voters were not exploited. The output was encour-
aging for the e-learning domain, and indicates that student agents can behave 
in a decentralised way and obtain their desired outcomes.  
Agent system for E-Learning System Involving Complex Preferences 
In chapter 5, we assumed that the preferences for different courses were inde-
pendent; however this is not always realistic. In chapter 6, we aimed  to 
demonstrate the potential of using multiagent systems and voting in settings 
where students have complex preferences and use a range of voting strategies. 
We extended the work by considering sophisticated preferences. In doing so, we 
investigated how the software agent votes on a student's behalf according to 
different degrees of complementary and substitutable preferences between 
courses. We adjusted the three strategies to work in the presence of rules be-
tween courses. We showed that, in the case where students have complex pref-
erences, as the number of rules increases, the student using intelligent and pro-
portional strategies perform better relative to equal-share. Also, we showed 
that, when the number of students is small, it enables each individual student 
to more significantly affect the voting outcome, and the intelligent strategy per-
forms significantly better than proportional.  
Fairness in intelligent system for E-Learning  
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The aim of Chapter 7 was to investigate the issue of fairness in intelligent 
agent-based e-learning systems and ensure fairness between individuals using 
different strategies in a system personalised to them. A simple framework was 
first introduced for measuring the fairness of results.  This was derived from 
literature containing definitions of formal metrics to describe the fairness. Three 
different notions of fairness were identified based on the theory of social wel-
fare: utilitarianism, equalitarianism and egalitarianism. We then used this 
framework to look at the fairness of different student agent strategies as meas-
ured by certain metrics. Two sets of experiments were carried out.  
In the first one, we modified the protocol to try and make it fairer by ap-
plying certain factors: exponent and weight. The exponent factor refers to the 
situation in which a student is given more power to express voting in the sys-
tem, whilst weight is given to the student who was not successful in impacting 
the system. The experiments showed that adding an exponent and weight does 
not make the system fairer, but if the exponent or the weight is lower than 1 
what happens reduces the impact of the protocol and therefore the protocol be-
comes less fair. Drawing from that, we could say that the proposed fairness 
framework works because it shows that the protocol is less fair when the factors 
are set below 1.  
The second set of experiments examined how the fairness of the system 
changed when two strategies worked in one cohort so that the number of stu-
dents for one strategy increased, whilst for the other it decreased. This type of 
distribution of the strategies showed that rather than getting maximum fairness 
when there was only a single strategy we find it increases as adding students 
with a better strategy.  This is because all of our fairness measures are linked. 
Looking at fairness from an individual agent’s point of view might reveal more, 
but when looking at a distributed system it is impossible to do this because the 
objectives of the individual agents are unknowable. So, in these distributed au-
tonomous systems, there is only one type of fairness that can be measured - in 
the form of social welfare - and by this measure our protocol is fair.  
8.2 Research findings 
In this section, the research findings are summarised. The following findings 
have been found in the thesis: 
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H1: In e-learning scenario such as academic course selection a decentralised 
agent system using voting protocol, can achieve almost identical level of overall 
student satisfaction as an optimal centralised approach while maintaining levels 
of privacy and choice. 
This hypothesis was tested in Chapter 5 and two main results were found: 
1. Voting procedures in particular and multiagent technology in general 
potentially can replace a centralised infrastructure. The most interest-
ing findings were that: 
a. There were no differences in mean satisfaction between students 
taking intelligent and proportional strategies and the optimal ac-
cording to the statistic results (for intelligent and optimal: t = 
1.778, dt = 98, p = 0.784 and for proportional and optimal: t = 
0.152, df = 98, p = 0.87).  
b. Because equal-share strategy is a naïve strategy in which voting 
points are allocated on an equal basis for each course, it has a 
poor performance. The results led us to reject the null hypothesis 
and accept the alternative that there is a difference in mean be-
tween equal-share strategy and optimal (equal-share and optimal 
produced the following results: t = 98.826, dt = 98, p =      
       ). 
2. Agent systems, where students use different strategies, can provide a 
way of providing personalisation of the learning process in a decentral-
ised matter. This can be seen by the impact of the three strategies on 
overall student satisfaction. The findings were that: 
a. There was not much difference between the intelligent and pro-
portional strategies when they were compared. In some cases 
where the same numbers of students were using different strate-
gies, the intelligent strategy slightly outperformed the proportion-
al strategy; whereas in other cases the proportional strategy out-
performed the intelligent strategy. These results show that the 
system (voting protocol) cannot be easily exploited by an intelli-
gent strategy. 
b. Intelligent and proportional strategies were both significantly 
more effective than the equal-share, irrespective of the proportion 
of students that used this strategy. 
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H2: Within system with complex preferences, an individual student that uses 
an intelligent predictive strategy will on average achieve a higher satisfaction 
than those taking a naïve or random strategy 
In Chapter 6 this hypothesis was tested with two main results found: 
1. Student agents who have complex preferences and use an intelligent 
strategy can achieve a higher level of satisfaction. The findings were 
that: 
a. As the number of rules increased, the better the intelligent strate-
gy performed relative to the equal share. On average, the im-
provement was around 4%, 6%, and 8% for NO rules, 50% rules, 
and 100% rules respectively. 
b. There were clear differences in the performance of the intelligent 
and proportional strategies where there were relatively fewer 
courses and students. The intelligent strategy significantly outper-
formed the proportional strategy when a student applied the rules, 
and this superiority increased as more rules were applied (intelli-
gent is better than proportional: t = 6.769, dt = 98, p = 
1.05      ).  
2. Even when students with sophisticated preferences used a range of vot-
ing strategies the overall students’ satisfaction was not affected. 
a. As the proportion of students using the intelligent strategy in-
creased, the satisfaction of all students either stayed the same or 
increased. Therefore, using a more intelligent approach did not 
harm the system as a whole. 
H3: As the proportion of individual agents utilising differently performing 
strategies in the system increases, the overall fairness of the result (as defined 
by equity theory) decreases. 
In Chapter 7 this hypothesis was tested, with two main results found: 
1. Fairness can be measured by the framework discussed in the thesis. 
This framework showed that the suggested protocol is sufficiently fair. 
The findings were that: 
a.  Counteractively, as the number of intelligent student is increased 
and the number of equal-share is reduced we get fairer results. 
This is because more and more students are doing well, making 
the system appears fairer overall.   
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H4: When having a uniform mixture of different strategies we can adjust the 
protocol by exponent and weight to make the protocol fairer. 
In Chapter 7 this hypothesis was tested, with two main results found: 
1. The exponent affects the performance of the strategies but does not af-
fect the fairness when we have mixed set of strategies. we found that: 
a. The intelligent and proportional strategies are both better than 
the equal-share strategy. The equal-share group stays about the 
same in all cases for different exponents. Moreover, in the mid-
range from 1 to 3, the intelligent strategy benefits from the expo-
nent and outperforms the other strategies in performance.  
b. From the utilitarian point of view, it could be said that a mid-
range exponent makes no difference in terms of the utilitarian as-
pect, but has a negative effect when small (less than 0.5) or large 
(greater than 2.5). The system is not affected by the exponent 
with regard to making it a more utilitarian system. 
c. In terms of equalitarian, we found exponent has no effect on the 
system and produce same trend for range over different exponent. 
The reason for that is proportional and equal-share strategies do 
not produce a decrease in their performance. 
d. Connected with egalitarian, the changes made by the exponent 
are not significant enough in the mid-range for us to say the ex-
ponent can make a difference in egalitarian terms. 
2. The weight increases the difference between strategies and it affects the 
utilitarian egalitarian fairness in some cases, but it does not affect for 
equalitarian.  In particular, we found that: 
a. Over different weights, that the group of intelligent and propor-
tional strategies have in all cases a better performance in compari-
son with the equal-share strategy. The clear performance is seen 
before weight 1 and then it stays stable as a flat trend. This is be-
cause the student is compensated for the cancellation of his or her 
preferred course which increases the points and gives them more 
value in the vote. The improvement gradually increases as long as 
the weight increases. Comparing intelligent and proportional, we 
note the intelligent strategy works better.  
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b. In terms of utilitarian fairness, before 1.0 there is a significant de-
crease in the performance of the cohort overall, but above 1.0 
there is no real difference. 
c. From equalitarian point of view, because the group of different 
strategies within the entire cohort produces a flat difference in the 
range epically above 1 , the system was not affected by weight 
and does not provide a differences in equalitarian.  
d. For the egalitarian, weight can affect the egalitarian of the system 
only if the weight is less than 1 and flat after. But weight does 
not have an effect on the egalitarian aspect. 
8.3 Limitations 
The main limitation of the results presented in this thesis is the usage of 
simulation. We haven’t used a real situation that maybe kind of human’s factor 
causes a problems. For example, in real life people my fail to express their pref-
erences correctly, something that cannot happen in the simulation. A simulation 
is often set up based on assumptions. Sometimes the success of the simulation depends on 
these assumptions but when the experiment is put in front of real people in a real situation, 
differences can appear.  
Also we looked particularly one kind of fairness which is social welfare the 
fairness outcome model which does not consider the potential of individual. But 
it seems to capture some views of the outcome in terms of an e-learning per-
spective that accepts a social welfare view of fairness. 
A further limitation is that we only look at one scenario and one protocol. 
Thus, if we were to take different scenarios and different protocols into account, 
the framework would be tested more carefully and evaluated more deeply. This 
would then provide more evidence about the functionality of the framework and 
how efficiently it works. 
8.4 Future Work  
There are a number of ways in which this work could be furthered, both in 
terms of a practical application, and also in exploring simulations of other sce-
narios. 
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8.4.1 From simulation to reality 
Throughout this thesis an investigation was undertaken into how agent systems 
using voting procedures can be applied in the e-learning domain. With im-
portant features of an agent system, such as autonomy and sociability, it is im-
portant to consider how students can be provided with a personalised course. It 
was demonstrated that this approach was effective and, in terms of overall so-
cial welfare, fair and therefore it could be applied to a real situation to find out 
more about the human aspects of such as system. If a course selection agent 
based system could be constructed whereby the course is distributed and the 
student is free to choose a certain strategy when making a selection, from an 
educational perspective, three questions could be considered:  firstly, how to 
make such an infrastructure work; secondly, how fair it is perceived to be by 
real students; and thirdly whether there would be a demand amongst students 
for such a system. 
8.4.2 Exploring other scenarios 
The agent system was applied to the particular case of course selection, but 
there were a number of other cases identified in this thesis. Conducting a simu-
lation for these cases would explore whether or not fairness exists in these cases 
as well, and whether or not the agent solution can provide more personalisation 
to students in areas other than course selection. We are particularly interested 
in applying agent technology to the cases mentioned in section 3.6 which in-
volve group formation and personalised learning.  
There are other important questions raised when considering the case of 
group formation and the use of agent technology. Firstly, how can a desirable 
mix of abilities be reached, so that no one set of student has advantage over 
another? Secondly, how can students be placed in the groups they want, whilst 
allowing the teacher the ability to arrange students in groups that will help 
them learn more material or more quickly? Thirdly, how fair is such a system? 
Regarding the case where there are a number of limited resources, such as 
tutorial slots, laboratory equipment, seminar places, the questions should be 
addressed thus: firstly, how agents could bargain with the institution until their 
utility function is maximised within the constraints of the institution’s cost lev-
el and; secondly, would such a scenario provide fair results to the student. 
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8.5  Conclusion 
In this thesis, the research has focused on how agent technology and voting 
procedures can be used in the e-learning domain, especially for personalised 
learning. We have drawn extensively on the literature on agent systems and 
technology and education, including personalised and informal learning, and the 
existing use of agent technology in e-learning.  
We believe that agent systems have a great deal of potential for e-learning 
as their widespread use could allow genuine decentralisation and personalisa-
tion, allowing some scenarios to be extended to include types of personal and 
informal learning that are difficult to support with today’s systems.  We also 
researched the issue of fairness in intelligent and personalised e-learning sys-
tems, where students can have different experiences as tasks.  In this context, 
we could say there is only one potential view of fairness for a distributed e-
learning system, which is the social welfare view that looks at the overall out-
come. From an e-learning perspective that accepts a social welfare view of fair-
ness, we can say we have a distributed system and a voting protocol that gives 
results that are fair.  
The results and the research in this thesis can be used as a foundation for 
more research to advance both voting-based agent systems and personalised 
education systems by the researchers in these fields. 
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 Appendix A
A.1 Identical Voting Strategies 
Table ‎A-1, Table ‎A-2 and Table ‎A-3 display the statistical result for case 2 
with 18 running courses. 
Table ‎A-1: Statistical values of comparison between intelligent strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 58.770 0.417 0.173 
Intelligent 58.626 0.431 0.068 
t = 1.697 df =98 p =0.092 
Table A-2: Statistical values of comparison between proportional strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 58.770 0.417 00.173 
Proportional 58.759 0.419 0.175 
        t = 0.131         df = 98                   p = 0.895 
Table ‎A-3: Statistical values of comparison between equal-share strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 58.770 0.417 0.173 
Equal-share 52.137 0.798 0.636 
     t = 52.091      df = 98           p =               
 
 
Table ‎A-4, Table ‎A-5 and Table ‎A-6 display the statistical result for case 
3 with 9 running courses. 
Table ‎A-4: Statistical values of comparison between intelligent strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 57.291 0.994 0.988 
Intelligent 57.096 1.084 1.175 
t = 0.937 df =98 p =0.350 
Table ‎A-5: Statistical values of comparison between proportional strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 57.291 0.994 0.988 
Proportional 57.252 1.025 1.050 
        t = 0.193        df = 98              p = 0.847 
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Table ‎A-6: Statistical values of comparison between equal-share strategy and optimal 
strategy mean SD variance 
Optimal 57.291 0.994 0.988 
Equal-share 50.221 1.445 2.088 
     t = 28.504       df = 98          p =               
 
A.2 Combination of Voting Strategies 
Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 show the result for case 2 where a group of students 
are allocated to one strategy, while the rest are allocated to another strategy. 
The number of running courses was set 18.  
 
Figure ‎A-1: Case 2: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
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Figure ‎A-2: Case 2: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
 
Figure A-3, Figure A-4 and Figure A-5 show the result for case 3 where a 
group of students are allocated to one strategy, while the rest are allocated to 
another strategy. The number of running courses was set 9.  
 
 
Figure A-3: Case 3: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
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Figure ‎A-4: Case 3: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
 
Figure ‎A-5: Case 3: Intelligent vs. Proportional 
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  Appendix B
Figure B-1 and Figure B-2 show the student satisfaction for group of agents 
using a particular strategy, as well as the overall average of student satisfaction 
for  case 1 where  proportion of students using a particular strategy for a differ-
ent percentage of the applied rules. The number of running courses was set 40. 
 
Figure ‎B-1: Case 1: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
 
Figure B-2: Case 1: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
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Figure B-3 and Figure B-4 show the student satisfaction for group of 
agents using a particular strategy, as well as the overall average of student sat-
isfaction for  case 1 where  proportion of students using a particular strategy 
for a different percentage of the applied rules. The number of running courses 
was set 9. 
 
Figure ‎B-3: Case 3: Proportional vs. Equal Share 
 
Figure ‎B-4: Case 3: Intelligent vs. Equal Share 
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  Appendix C
Figure C-1, Figure C-2 and Figure C-3 how the mean, median and range for 
utilitarian, egalitarian and equalitarian respectively as measures for fairness for 
the case3 when mixing equal-share and proportional. 
 
Figure ‎C-1: Case 3: mean when Equal-Share and Proportional 
 
Figure ‎C-2: Case 3:median when Equal-Share and Proportional 
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Figure ‎C-3: Case3: range when Equal-Share and Proportional 
Figure C-4, Figure C-5 and Figure C-6 show the mean, median and range 
for utilitarian, egalitarian and equalitarian respectively as measures for fairness 
for the case 3 when mixing proportional and intelligent. 
 
Figure ‎C-4: Case3: mean when Proportional and Intelligent 
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Figure C-5: Case3: median when Proportional and Intelligent 
 
Figure ‎C-6: Case3: range when Proportional and Intelligent 
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